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ABSTRACT
A Framework for the Performance Analysis and
Tuning of Virtual Private Networks
Fridrich Shane Perez
School of Technology, BYU
Master of Science
With the rising trend of personal devices like laptops and smartphones being used in
businesses and significant enterprises, the concern for preserving security arises. In addition to
preserving security measures in outside devices, the network speed and performance capable by
these devices need to be balanced with the security aspect to avoid slowing down virtual private
network (VPN) activity. Performance tests have been done in the past to evaluate available
software, hardware, and network security protocol options that will best benefit an entity
according to its specific needs. With a variety of comparable frameworks available currently, it is
a matter of pick and choose.
This study is dedicated to developing a unique process-testing framework for personal
devices by comparing the default security encryptions of different VPN architectures to the
Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS) set of complying encryptions. VPN
architectures include a vendor-supplied VPN, Palo Alto Networks, open-sourced OpenVPN
application, and a Windows PPTP server to test security protocols and measure network speed
through different operating platforms.
The results achieved in this research reveal the differences between the default security
configurations and the encryption settings enforced by FIPS, shown through the collected
averaged bandwidth between multiple network tests under those settings. The results have been
given additional analysis and confidence through t-tests and standard deviation. The
configurations, including difficulty in establishing, between different VPNs also contribute to
discovering OpenVPN under FIPS settings to be favorable over a Palo Alto firewall using FIPSCC mode due to higher bandwidth rate despite following the same encryption standards.

Keywords: VPN, FIPS, security protocol, encryption, network security, bandwidth, performance,
framework
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1

INTRODUCTION

Background & Motivation
Networks, especially those belonging to high-earning businesses and significant
enterprises, are compromised often due to interference by third party attackers. Virtual Private
Networks (VPNs) are high in demand among enterprises as a VPN can protect an organization’s
sensitive data through its use of security protocols, making it the preferred method of connecting
remote data centers together. A VPN is essentially an extension of an organization’s private
network for remote users to join and provide the intranet to link branch offices to the enterprise
network. The ability to provide a secure connection remotely is the key factor of any satisfactory
VPN. To be successful, VPNs must be configured and managed correctly. For example, an
organization implementing an Internet Protocol security (IPsec) VPN through Cisco devices
would need to know how to resolve an out of order configuration with solutions such as enabling
NAT-traversal or even testing the connection with a ping to figure out what to do next.
The devices that connect to the VPN play a major role in adhering to security
configuration, such as if their prewritten operating coding would allow the VPN connections to
either perform optimally or hinder it. There are two types of devices to be aware of in a work
setting. The first type of device is the out-of-the-box default, in which the device’s internal
scripts and operating system has been preconfigured to operate solely to the standards of its
designated work environment. This type of device is typically fresh out of the manufacturer’s
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box with only the basic applications and background processes running upon startup. The second
type of device is coined as Bring Your Own Device (BYOD). BYOD is self-explanatory, in
which a worker uses his or her personalized laptop or smartphone for work purposes. A BYOD
may not be appropriately accustomed to the workplace’s network due to different purposes and
scripting. For example, a user might have social media apps running in the background of his
personal computer, which would drain CPU resources and indirectly slow down productivity. As
such, the differences between a BYOD and a device programmed strictly for enterprise purposes
are shown through their respective network performances.
VPN design is based on the security tunneling protocol a VPN implements. Security
protocol is one choice a VPN administrator needs to make. The following protocols are three
common choices: IPsec, Secure Sockets Layer (SSL), and Point to Point Tunneling Protocol
(PPTP).
IPsec is a security protocol designed to authenticate and encrypt IP packets during
communication sessions between network devices. It ensures authentication integrity and
confidentiality through two protocols, Authentication Header (AH) and Encapsulation Security
Payload (ESP). The AH protocol provides data authentication and integrity through encryption
algorithms like HMAC-SHA and HMAC-MD5. AH also authenticates IP packet headers and
their payloads. The ESP protocol functions similarly to the AH protocol in providing data
authentication, as well as confidentiality through encryption, but it only authenticates the IP
datagram portion of an IP packet. IPsec operates on layer 3 of the OSI model.
SSL is a security protocol that basically provides a secure communication channel
between a network machine and an Internet site host. It is recognizable as the “https” prefix in a
URL on a web browser address bar. SSL uses an encryption algorithm to encrypt both the link
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and the traveling data, preventing the latter to be easily read by eavesdroppers and packet sniffers
as plaintext.
PPTP is a legacy VPN protocol regarded for implementing a basic point-to-point
tunneling mechanism as its security measure. It is often selected as the default security protocol
despite its known security issues of not having its own encryption and authentication standards.
PPTP is valued because of its low overhead, making it a fast-operating protocol compared to
other security protocols, whose encryption and authentication processes incur overhead and
cause the network to perform slower as a result. The missing security issue is remedied with the
Microsoft Point-to-Point Encryption (MPPE) protocol. However, IPsec was developed as a
relatively better alternative for VPNs with having the benefits of high speed performance and
sufficiently strong security settings. Nonetheless, PPTP is included within this small list of
protocols for comparison purposes.
This thesis develops a framework system for measuring the network performance of
different endpoint devices connecting to different VPNs within an isolated local network
environment by comparing the default protocol settings each VPN uses to the encryption settings
defined by the Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS), specifically FIPS 140-2:
Security Requirements For Cryptographic Modules (Caddy, 2005). FIPS are publicly announced
cryptographic module standards developed by the United States federal government for use in
computer systems in non-military government agencies and government contractors. FIPS
computer systems to use a strict set of encryptions such as SHA.
In this research, framework is defined as a testbed environment demonstrating the
processes between a client device connecting to a server under different VPN settings. The
framework is validated by the following configurations and actions. The VPN architectures
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would be from Palo Alto, a proprietary software, OpenVPN, an open-source application, and a
Windows Server utilizing PPTP. Default settings for each VPN are compared against active FIPS
settings. Network performance tests are performed through the iperf network tool, in which the
interval, transfer size, and bandwidth serve as measurement units. The iperf server endpoint is set
upon a Windows desktop. The comparisons are done under separate devices with Windows, Mac,
and Android serving as the client endpoints. The tests are going to be conducted under these
configurations to determine consistency between FIPS and non-FIPS settings and how much
influence the results have on network security and speed performance. In addition, using iperf
and the network router interface of the gateway router, fixed transfers of 100 MBytes are
performed beforehand on each VPN setting as a solid baseline defining overhead from bytes per
frame.
The results of this study provide the insight needed to confirm the direct relationship of
the effect of active encryption policies on VPN network bandwidth and ultimately validate the
tuning framework for future use. Depending on how the accumulated performances results differ
against that of the fixed transfers, pending analyses can determine if significant deviances from
the baseline are the result of system background processes or encryption overhead.

Objectives / Goals
The main objective of this study is to determine network tuning parameters by producing
a framework measuring performances of different VPN types within an isolated local network
environment by comparing the default protocol settings each VPN uses to FIPS-defined settings.
The VPNs are individually defined by three known tunneling protocols: IPsec, SSL, and PPTP.
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The first two protocols are utilized in two different infrastructures: IPsec in an enterprise VPN
technology and SSL in an OpenVPN server.
From the performance analyses, network metrics such as bandwidth sent over a fixed
transfer of data through the iperf network tool are going to be measured. For the sake of
simplicity, it should be noted that this network performance tool is open-sourced, available to
download and utilize in all involved operating systems. As for the secure protocols themselves,
they are implemented according to current default practices, specifically encryption algorithms.
The focus covers these protocols under different VPN infrastructures, in which case they are
used as the default protocol for their respective VPNs.
Additional factors to be considered on top of testing security performance include
measurement of device’s CPU and memory usage, bandwidth overhead, aggregate overhead,
policies set within the device, and loads to be used for performance testing. On top of
configuring security settings and strength, it would also be important to keep an eye out on these
factors if they demonstrate differences in network behavior during the trial run.

Problem Statement / Hypotheses
There are one research objection and one research question to be answered during this
undertaking. The main objective is to a prototype framework for evaluating a VPN configuration
based on the performance through the connecting personal devices. The research question
inquires of the differences between a VPN using FIPS-enforced encryption standards against its
default security settings. The corresponding hypothesis determines factors affecting potential
differences in bandwidth between VPNs using their default settings and FIPS-supported settings
to be the result of aggregating encryption overhead. These hypotheses ultimately direct the study
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in developing the appropriate secure VPN framework, such as how to make full use of default
options and which settings on the device require focused hardening modification.
•

The development of the framework has best practice settings requiring a vendor-supplied
configuration of algorithm choice and settings. The settings are to be evaluated through a
series of performance tests as to determine a desired balance between network speed and
security.

•

For this selection, default security options provided for each VPN architecture are
evaluated against a standard officially published and provided by the US federal
government.

•

Differing bandwidth and transfer rates between FIPS and non-FIPS settings can be traced
back to factors like system CPU usage and encryption overhead.

Methodology
For this study, the computer platforms to be used for the testing were based from current
popular usage. The considered platforms include Windows, Mac, Android, and Linux. Windows
and Linux are the operating systems housing the featured VPNs as Palo Alto and OpenVPN
prominently run on the latter, with Palo Alto based on CentOS and OpenVPN able to be hosted
by Ubuntu Server, while the PPTP server can be set up on a Windows Server platform. The
VPNs operate as VMs in an ESXi environment stored in one machine, which is further explained
in the Methodology chapter. As for the factors involved with the VPN aspect, they have been
divided and categorized into three fields, which include VPN architecture, metrics to be
measured, and security protocols. See Figure 1-1 for the initial stages of the mapped
methodology for the framework.
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Figure 1-1: Prototype Methodology Diagram

The prototype methodology maps out the comparison of VPN infrastructures according
to secure tunneling protocols such as IPsec and SSL on their effect on network speed by running
performance analyses varying the settings of encryption algorithms and hardware configurations
to determine useful recommendations for improvement. Parameters involved in this research
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include bandwidth, CPU and memory consumption, current secure best practices, and type of
platforms and operating systems used.
In addition, the methodology requires conducting thorough performance analyses for
each secure VPN protocol for readily available platforms with and without active security
settings. From the performance analyses, the network performance tool records transfer and
bandwidth at intervals of ten seconds. As for the secure protocols themselves, they are
implemented according to current practices, such as recommended encryption algorithms.
Security settings considered within scope include protocols and changeable factors such
as encryption algorithm choice. Devices utilizing the network have been modified accordingly
and appropriately to conform to up-to-date security and speed standards. Differences between
bandwidth according to the transfer rate of packets reveal the incurred overhead as additional
enforcement.
To measure network traffic with and without security settings, including FIPS-enforced
settings, the iperf network tool is to be used. The tool can measure the interval, transfer, and
bandwidth between devices. The results generated with it are compared with benchmarks
provided by the non-VPN connection as well as a fixed transfer file test. Four test categories
have been decided to be the following: one without defined security settings, one through IPsec
(Palo Alto), one through SSL (OpenVPN), and one through PPTP (Windows Server).

Delimitations / Assumptions
Delimitation 1: The Palo Alto VPN is the only vendor-supplied VPN used in this research,
provided by the BYU Cyber Security Research Lab (CSRL). It represents the enterprise
applications factor for the framework.
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Delimitation 2: The above enterprise VPN is compared with OpenVPN, the only open-sourced
VPN server application to be used for this research, and with a Windows Server VM that has
PPTP VPN installed.
Delimitation 3: The Windows Server 2016 VM using PTTP has been installed by scratch, using
only its factory default settings. The only major configurations to be aware of regards the
installation of the PPTP server, configuration of its network adapters, and the capacity to toggle
FIPS settings on or off when appropriate.
Delimitation 4: One network performance test is a fixed transfer of 100 MBytes for each VPN
setting as to provide an additional overhead benchmark in comparing bandwidth differences on a
client.
Delimitation 5: Because the direction of this thesis involves the testing and tuning of VPN
settings through personal devices, Linux VMs are not required, but can be used for additional
data in need of extra clarification.
Assumption 1: Android, Mac, and Windows are the only operating systems to serve as the client
side of the framework while one Windows Server OS serves as the server agent.
Assumption 2: VPN security protocols are tested by their default settings prior to experimental
configuration. If default settings are not applied, the vendors’ published recommended approach
are to be followed.

Glossary
Bring Your Own Device (BYOD) – A term used to define a user’s personal computer or
smartphone being used to handle work matters. Is used interchangeably with “personal device.”
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Framework – A structure defining an environment where a user can freely test integral
processes for analytical purposes.
Internet Protocol security (IPsec) – A protocol that authenticates and encrypts IP packets for
communication over the network.
Point to Point Tunneling Protocol (PPTP) – A common VPN protocol known for its
satisfactory speed performance because it lacks a defined security feature of its own.
Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) – A security cryptographic protocol that provides communications
security over a network. It is commonly used in certificates for web sites, verifying their
trustworthiness for communicating sensitive data through.
Virtual Private Network (VPN) – A private network enabling users to share and receive data
across a public network, such as the Internet, as though they are physically connected to the
network.
Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS) – A set of public standards provided by the
United States federal government that strictly define information technology standards such as
encryption algorithms for use within non-military government agencies and government
contractors. Validated encryption algorithms used by FIPS 140-2 include AES, Escrowed
Encryption Standard, and Triple-DES symmetric keys, SHA family hashes, and asymmetric keys
DSA, RSA, and ECDSA.
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2

LITERATURE REVIEW

A review of VPN protocols, performance tests conducted on VPNs and VPN-related
technology applications, hardware instructions for VPN usage, security approaches and
developments are explored in this literature review. Topics related to encryption algorithm
application, contributing to VPN security protocol strength and overhead effects on network
transfer rate, are also discussed.

VPN Security Protocols
VPN security protocols define the security strength and network speed functionalities for
devices communicating within the VPN area. There are protocols that define the tradeoff
between network speed and security, either specializing in one over the other or attempting to
achieve a balance between the two fields.
A survey took note of particular differences between the PPTP and IPsec protocols in
how they provide secure communications within a VPN (Yadav, 2016). PPTP, developed by
Microsoft, is a widely supported VPN method for Windows platforms due to incurring the least
amount of overhead in its performance, which marks it as the fastest among VPN protocols. The
lack of overhead is due to PPTP not including a defined encryption/authentication feature on its
own. The remedy to PPTP’s missing encryption feature is the inclusion of the Microsoft Pointto-Point Encryption (MPPE) protocol to provide the secure aspects of VPN connections.
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By contrast, IPsec does not require another protocol to provide secure connections as it
already possesses an encryption feature. At the cost of its own strong security and usage of
encryption algorithms, IPsec suffers in incurring additional overhead and latency. Despite the
performance issue, the same survey establishes IPsec as the “standard” VPN solution over PPTP
with security being highly valued over speed performance.
Even with network communications preserved and protected through IPsec, the standard
solution protocol has been tested with exploitation methods as to uncover any potential
vulnerability. One such exploit involves injecting IPsec tunnels with an abundance of data
packets in order to cause their gateways to reduce their tunnels’ Path Maximum Transmission
Unite (PMTU) and leave the network vulnerable to a Denial of Service (DoS) attack. This
exploit is called the Packet Too Big – Packet Too Small Internet Control Message Protocol
(PTB-PTS ICMP) attack. The networking world is not a stranger to DoS attacks as they are
frequently used to slow down services of an organization by the hands of rival competitors or
malicious attackers.
One legacy method of mitigating DoS attacks within the range of IPsec tunnels is through
the Path Maximum Transmission Unite discovery (PMTUd) mechanism. There is, however, a
modified PMTUd algorithm that utilizes a packetization layer protocol with an
acknowledgement mechanism like Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) instead of relying on
ICMP (Roca & Fall, 2014). This method prevents DoS attacks by setting up automatic time-outs
in the event that such an attack is detected. However, PMTUd does suffer from the setback of
ICMP packets being filtered out by routers and firewalls on the way to the sender.
In any case, IPsec is still considered for testing upon a variety of network architectures as
to evaluate its overall security effectiveness, such as implementations done upon Neighborhood
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Area Network (NAN) architectures to protect traffic communications (Aouini, Ben Azzouz, &
Saidane, 2016). NANs make up smart grids that manage electrical appliances inside their range.
Factors to consider in the IPsec-implemented NAN architecture design include dynamic data
exchange and monitoring smart meters that have limited computational capacity. This study
provides an evaluation framework for IPsec, and to an extension other VPN protocols such as
PPTP and SSL, by establishing the physical range of the network area and setting parameters
regarding network communications to measure.

VPN Applications
The application of a VPN technology for any organization is to ensure a secure network
connection for its users to share data with the organization’s private network. It stands to reason
that the main purpose for a VPN is to prevent sensitive data, such as bank accounts or passwords
for example, from falling into the wrong hands while at the same time to allow authorized users
to access the private network through their devices.
An integral part of the VPN process involves optimal managing of tunnel performance in
the virtual architecture (Liyanage, Ylianttila, & Gurtov, 2016). Studies by Liyanage and
colleagues were done upon a similarly related network technology called Virtual Private LAN
Service (VPLS), wherein participants of the VPN are connected through a multipoint Ethernet
LAN connection. Tunneling mechanisms used in VPLS were described to be static, complex,
and inflexible in nature. These weaknesses resulted issues in scalability, overused network
resources, high delays, and high operational costs. A solution Liyanage proposed was to develop
a Software Defined Network (SND)-based VPLS architecture that includes new tunneling
mechanisms to remedy the vulnerabilities. The dynamic tunnel establishment mechanism and the
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tunnel resumption mechanism granted additional structure to the VPLS by keeping better track
of its tunnel manageability, allowing for smoother connection rates and significantly lowered
resource usage rates. The idea of implementing different mechanisms for better network
transition and communication is a concept to keep in mind in developing future best practices
applicable for a wide variety of devices involved in the architecture.
Another field in VPNs that can be altered upon is authentication, wherein GPS
information with geo-privacy protection can be implemented to enhance authentication measures
(Jin, Tomoishi, & Matsuura, 2016). Users would correlate GPS with mobile devices upon
thinking about which device would be best suited to use for GPS technology. Known cyberattack methods, such as data breaching and Denial of Service (DoS), have commonly interfered
with organizations’ operations within their networks. Jin and colleagues utilized geo-privacy
protection to enhance VPN authentication by factoring in GPS information as an additional
security step on top of default VPN authentication and identification practices. Geo-privacy
protection mitigates the risk of GPS information leaks by registering a valid area based on GPS
information on the VPN authentication server and storing latitude and longitude coordinate bits
as authentication parameters. In their research, SSL VPN was used due to SSL’s design being
better suited for personal user remote access compared to other formats like IPsec or PPTP. Jin’s
research and trial run on using geo-privacy protection was marked to be successful, wherein hit
rates corresponding to latitude and longitude bits neared one-hundred percent and the overall
project has been opened for future work, preferably on RADIUS server. The concept from this
research inspires additional security-hardening methods not commonly found through most
organizations, in which the standard use of firewalls and tunneling protocols suffice in ensuring
secure network communications.
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Following the lines of VPN application on mobile technology, there have been standards
devised to utilize mobile devices and BYODs more frequently in the workplace based off of a
survey regarding mobile VPN technologies (Alshalan, Pisharody, & Huang, 2016). Alshalan and
colleagues’ research on mobile security highlights the factor of technology evolution with the
increase of BYODs used in the workplace. To adapt to the growing popularity of personal device
usage, Alshadan’s team used data from their survey, which was addressed to general IT and
security professionals, to develop an explicit standard for mobile VPNs. Mobile VPN solutions
such as Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) / Multi-Protocol Level Switching (MPLS)-based VPNS
and mobile IPv4 IPsec VPNS were highlighted for the survey to place emphasis on creating a
mobile VPN standard. Following the survey and data analysis, Alshalan and colleagues found
that mobile VPN based on MIPv4 and IPsec as proposed by the IETH is the most consistent
according to the desired criteria for secure mobile devices in private networks. Ultimately, the
research was meant for readers to understand the technical backgrounds and open issues of
mobile VPNs to inspire future work and research to develop a structured methodology and
design VPN solutions that can resolve said open issues. The open issues include Software
Defined Network (SDN)-enabled mobile VPN, application persistence, lightweight VPN tunnel
resumption, VPN tunnel handover, detection of network disruption, and battery consumption &
Network Address Translating (NAT)-ing proxies.

Commodity Hardware & Frameworks
Depending on the extent of an organization’s security needs, certain aspects pertaining to
a VPN should be configured accordingly. Such aspects include software, hardware, and a set of
protocols for network communications to follow. However, there are also the devices, ranging
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from personal computers to mobile devices, that utilize the VPN to consider if an organization
wants to optimize network speed and performance for involved users.
The functionality for a network infrastructure can be highly efficient even with
commodity hardware when arranged appropriately (Raumer, Gallenmuller, Emmerich, Mardian,
& Carle, 2016). A study with commodity off-the-shelf (COTS) servers was performed with the
intent of proving that such hardware can match the performance levels of high-end expensive
networking hardware while keeping external hardware costs low and manageable. For this study,
Raumer and team tested Network Interface Controller (NIC) offloading with two Intel 10 GbE
NICs, which were Intel X540 and Intel 82599. These NICs were ideally within parameters for
the research due to their support of IPsec encryption and authentication up to 1024 different
security associations in each direction, as well as up to 128 IP addresses at the receiver side.
Following a series of network performance tests to determine the true capabilities of COTS
hardware, Raumer and colleagues found the results as positive. A contributing factor to the
success of proving commodity hardware matching high-end expensive equipment is the open
source device driver the Intel NICs used, which was based from the Data Plane Development Kit
(DPDK) and MoonGen traffic packet generators. In additional, while the idea of IPsec
capabilities working on NICs is nothing unfamiliar in the networking world, this research is
marked as the first case study to actively engage into testing hardware performances instead of
standard tunneling protocols with network performance parameters.
In addition to hands-on testing with commodity hardware selection, frameworks offering
faster alternatives to compensate for hardware limitations, such as packet rates given by 10 Gbit
Ethernet, were examined for the potential gain of reducing overhead and CPU-induced
bottleneck (Gallenmüller, Emmerich, Wohlfart, Raumer, & Carle, 2015). Existing software
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frameworks, namely netmap, Intel DPDK, and PF_RING ZC, were surveyed on Linux
networking for high-performance packet IO under the limitations of network bandwidth, CPU
cycle performance, PCI express bandwidth, and maximum transfer rate determined by Ethernet
standards. Like the previous study on commodity hardware, this research utilizes two 10 Gbit
NICs for packet handling. The three packet IO frameworks require modified drivers and share
the same techniques in packet performance, which include bypassing the default network stack,
relying on polling to receive packets instead of interrupts, and preallocating packet buffers at the
start of an application with no further deallocation and allocation or memory during execution of
an application.
Once the theoretical aspects of packet IO forwarding were established from existing
frameworks, measurement setup was focused on integral factors such as CPU cycles per packet
and throughput to compare the framework performances. This research discovered additional
factors that affect packet IO performance, which include cache influence, batch size influence,
and latency. Ultimately, large batch sizes were shown to increase performance and latency in
addition to the trade-off between queue sizes, concluding in DPDK and PF_RING’s superiority
over netmap in terms of these parameters. All things considered, it is a matter of proper
application of a framework through modified system interfaces that would allow high
performance rates while keeping in mind network interface limitation to avoid crashing it.

Performance Testing
To determine the effectiveness of software, hardware, and protocol implementation in
VPNs and general network architecture, statistics regarding network performance and traffic
need to be obtained for comparisons. Depending on the research question and problem
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statements supporting the inquiry, metrics and parameters can generally vary. However, most
network performance tests require the analysis of collected bandwidth and packet transfer rates
to verify or disprove speed between different software and hardware.
A study was done regarding the interoperability concerning transition mechanisms
between IPv4 and IPv6 networks (Narayan, Ishrar, Kumar, Gupta, & Khan, 2016). Considering
how IPv4 has been used for over thirty-five years, making the change into IPv6 would not be a
quick and easy task. End to end network performance tests were conducted to determine the most
effective method of utilizing transition mechanisms developed by the Internet Engineering Task
Force (IETF) to allow an IPv4 network transition into the more advanced IPv6. Out of the three
discussed transition mechanisms, which are dual-stack, tunneling, and translation, the tunneling
mechanism was placed in focus for the testing. The performances were tested under Windows 7
and Windows Server 2012, as well as with and without PPTP and IPsec protocols active. It was
found that the 6to4 transition protocol is the faster and more reliable mechanism compared to
4to6 due to having significantly lower delay among consistently reliable results. In addition, 6to4
with IPsec produced the highest amount of TCP DNS throughput compared to the other three
combinations involving 4to6 and PPTP. Future work based from this study may include testing
on different platforms, such as Mac and even the Android mobile platform, to determine more
efficient systems combining speed and security.
There is also the basis of understanding the performance differences in operating with
and without an active security protocol like IPsec, specifically on processing delays on
automated nodes for this study (Hirschler & Sauter, 2016). The research focusing on these
parameters tested within resource-limited devices using Intel and ARM-based architectures on
System on a Chip (SoC) hardware. The driving problem statement for this research was to
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provide feasible security features for automated smart grid applications as IPsec was originally
designed for IT environment, not automation networks. The transmission and receiving delays
were measured upon seven series, starting from normal IPv6 transmission before combining it
with two encrypting algorithms used in IPsec, which are Authentication Header (AH) and
Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP). On top of testing without IPsec, six different
combinations were made from the encryption algorithms through IPsec’s tunneling and transport
modes by testing both modes with AH, then ESP, and finally both combined. Collected test data
proved additional security features, namely the combined encryption algorithms, incurred more
overhead compared to plain IPv6 transmission. In addition, IPsec tunnel mode with encryption
algorithms incurs higher delays than transport mode under the same corresponding settings. As
for hardware, Intel has shorter transmission and receive delay ranges with the implementations of
AH and ESP compared to plain IPv6 than ARM.
There is also a focus concerning the performance of IPsec, determining if hardware
implementations do affect speed (Rao, Newe, Grout, & Mathur, 2016). One study holds a claim
that hardware implementations on security algorithms provide high-speed and real-time
performance for applications like data integrity and confidentiality. Considering that IPsec is
computationally intensive to secure the transfer of data, this issue would warrant attention
involving the improving of its speed. An attempted hardware implementation involved a field
programmable gate array (FPGA) capable of dedicated operations that can provide more
consistent and higher performance statistics, at least when compared to software
implementations, with a SHA-3 encryption algorithm. The idea behind utilizing FPGA is that it
is considered as the best leading representation hardware devices of the modern era, shown with
significantly higher throughput compared to previous attempts.
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This research is notable for being the first published work showing hardware
implementation on IPsec without any soft-core processor involvement while permitting a major
SHA-3 contribution in the sense of using the algorithm to handle IPv4 datagrams through IPsec’s
transport and tunnel modes.
Additional performance testing on IPsec, in an attempt to compare its throughput and
round-trip time (RTT) with that of SSL, has been done on a Windows 7 platform and 802.11n
WLAN (Kolahi, Cao, & Chen, 2013). Additional details in this performance testing include
comparing the Windows 7 and WLAN to open system and using Triple Data Encryption
Standard – Secure Hash Algorithm (3DES-SHA), and Advanced Encryption Standard – Secure
Hash Algorithm (AES-SHA). This performance testing show that IPsec VPN had the
significantly better throughput and RTT performance than SSL. While it is true that using strong
security settings lowers network performance and increases delay, IPsec had a maximum
decrease of 60.28% in TCP throughput compared to open system while SSL had a maximum
decrease up to 97.03%. In the same comparison to open system, bandwidth with IPsec dropped
50% while bandwidth with SSL dropped 96%. As such, network settings with IPsec won’t suffer
much delay or low throughput than with SSL, making IPsec the better choice in this scenario.
This research has opened itself up to future experimentation with other VPN technologies, such
as PPTP and L2TP, as well as the opportunity to utilize other operating systems like Linux in this
case study.
Aside from individually testing software, hardware, and protocol options for private
networks, performance testing has allowed the capacity to appropriately modify enterprise and
campus-sized networks with Virtual Local Area Networks (VLANs) to control the broadcast
traffic and lessen the chance for congestions to occur (Ashraf & Yousaf, 2016). This can address
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an issue of inter-VLAN routing, wherein a host from one VLAN communicates to a host of
another VLAN through a forwarding layer-3 device. The issue is that security would be at a high
risk with the enterprise network segments being geographically dispersed to the extent that
outside unauthorized parties could take advantage of the congestions between segments and slip
into the network undetected. Security perspective of VLANs and inter-VLAN routing was
investigated through IPv6 protocol and IPsec tunneling, ultimately constructing a secure
architecture from evaluating these security measures. The IPsec virtual tunnel interface is created
through the “interface tunnel int-number” command while comparing IPv6 with IPv4
performance. The results of the traffic simulations are collected as round-trip delay (RTD) and
are compared under four situations: using a layer-3 switch with no security, using different
switches with no security, using different switches through IPsec transport mode, and using
different switches through IPsec tunneling mode. Running IPv4 with no security had consistently
low delay while IPv6 under IPsec tunneling mode achieved low delay almost reaching the former;
both results utilized different switches. For the sake of overhead efficiency and security, it is
concluded that IPv6 routing with IPsec tunnel mode would be the ideal method to implement in
an IPsec VPN.

Encryption Algorithms
The functionality of a security protocol relies on its capacity to utilize encryption
algorithms to encode data to the point that intruding outside parties cannot decipher the
communication. There is a tradeoff between speed and security concerning encryption
algorithms as the more computationally intense they operate in securing date, the slower the
system communicates.
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For the most part, security is highly favored regardless of intensity or complexity,
especially for a system that is willing to entertain the idea of a multi-phase encryption technique
in place of typical algorithms like Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) and Blowfish on top of
traditional VPN security settings (Singh & Gupta, 2016). The purpose for increased complexity
aside from strengthened security is to prevent data tampering in case a compromised link occurs
in the network.
AES has been performance tested on a 2010 Intel Core processor due to previous
research finding the correlation between the AES cipher behavior and processor core scaling
(Uskov, Byerly, & Heinemann, 2016). Hardware acceleration and a set of new instructions (NI)
written for AES that can execute under significantly fewer clock cycles than a software solution
provided the test settings needed to compare with AES under default settings in the same Intel
architecture. This testing of AES-NI involves running AES with RMM ready-to-be-streamed
files of sizes 100 MB, 200 MB, 500 MB, 1000 MB, and 2000 MB with the AES-NI instructions
enabled and disabled. Lastly, the AES cipher operations are divided into five different modes,
which are CTR, ECB, CBC, CFB, and OFB. These AES modes are what would define the final
results of the performance analysis, determining which one would work the most efficiently or
had the best median. Following the testing on the AES-NI hardware acceleration, the research
concludes that the AES-ECB mode had the best median performance out of the five AES modes
with AES-NI enabled. Also, with AES-NI disabled but still running with the same Intel hardware,
AES-CTR gained the best median performance, but was still beaten by ECB mode. However, the
findings do not recommend using ECB mode for secure VPN networks as it cannot completely
hide encrypted data patterns, and as such, recommend CTB mode instead as CTB mode had the
second-best performance in AES-NI enabled mode.
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There is also the concept of implementing encryption and decryption algorithms through
graphics processing unit (GPU) technology (Heinemann, Chaduvu, Byerly, & Uskov, 2016). By
correlation, the use of OpenCL and CUDA software platforms, the latter specifically integrating
with NVIDIA GPU technology, would entertain the idea of additional effects software
implementations place upon the efficiency of encryption and decryption. This concept would
then extend to how the changes in algorithm behavior could be affecting secure network traffic
performance, such as if the enhanced complexity is slowing down the communication rate.
As for FIPS-compliant algorithms, a case study was done in which a Triple Data
Encryption Algorithm (TDEA) was to be implemented in a FIPS 140-2 defined module (Barker
& Barker, 2012). Modes of operation for TDEA are specified by SP 800-38: Recommendation
for Block Cipher Modes of Operation. To qualify for compliance, TDEA was designed from the
preceding DEA specified in FIPS 46, effective July 1977 for the data protection of federal
agencies prior to withdrawal. The DEA cryptographic engine protected blocks of data consisting
of sixty-four bits under a sixty-four-bit key, the functions now implemented in TDEA. The
applications for TDEA were directed for environments requiring strong cryptographic protection,
but the testing for TDEA was formatted in a way that its implementations would depend on the
needs of the environment in question.
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3

METHODOLOGY

This thesis focuses on one research objective and one research question:
Research Objective 1 (RO-1): Develop and test a framework based on best practice
settings requiring a vendor-supplied configuration of algorithm choice and settings and their
effects on overall network performance.
Research Question 2 (RQ-2): What are the differences between a VPN using FIPSvalidated encryption algorithms compared to its vendor-provided default security settings?
Research Hypothesis 2 (RH-2): Differences between FIPS and non-FIPS settings are
found in bandwidth and bit transfer attributed to encryption overhead.
The answers and processes for the above objectives are detailed by the following VPN
study framework, metric assessment, secure best practices, VPN configurations, and network
performance analysis methodology in this section.

RO-1: Framework Development and Testing
The development for the framework began with the purpose of assessing the viability of
VPN security protocols and determining a correlation between their effect on network
performance. The practicability of VPN protocols using their default settings and encryption
algorithms would also be tested against FIPS-enforced encryptions. The concept behind this
framework is to determine the ideal security settings derived from a vendor-supplied

24

configuration and apply appropriate changes either to the network setup or to the personal
devices using the VPN to allow optimal network speed and security performance. The intent
behind starting with default settings for VPN and personal device configurations is to build the
framework from scratch and branch off into a different direction than previous network
performance tests were used for. As such, this framework development project is simply
codenamed “FAVE,” an acronym for FIPS Application VPN Evaluation.
Related existing frameworks on the topic were found, most of which are composed of
VPN architectures that performed comparisons on factors for hardware CPU and memory usage,
the strength between encryption algorithms, and selected platforms as described in the literature
review chapter. These factors were tested within a selected VPN infrastructure at a time. Despite
these findings, there was no specific framework that focused on testing the private network
reachability between different VPN security settings under the same platforms, or at least under
the VPN types and client devices used for this research.
FAVE has been developed from scratch due to a lack of sufficient existing frameworks
matching the direction of this research. The development consists of two parts, setting up the
VPN server and running network performance tests on a selected device within the VPN while
under a security protocol. The configurations for each VPN are bound to vary in time and in
setup methodology, which include either a few clicks to enable certain options or opening a
Terminal or Command Prompt interface to input needed lines to install or activate specific
processes. And as mentioned previously, the resulting network statistics are collected through the
iperf network tool, which is executed via Terminal or Command Prompt on both the client and
the server sides. See Figure 3-1 for an illustrated prototype of the framework’s processes in VPN
performance testing.
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Figure 3-1: Flowchart of Framework Prototype

3.1.1

Network Performance Testing
The general purpose for network performance tests is to evaluate traffic behavior and

determine factors that influence its transfer rate. For the typical user, he or she wouldn’t concern
themselves with the deeper and intricate details of network architecture that affect speed and
security if the user is able to connect to the desired destination address without issue.
The general process of performing a network performance test is simple and selfexplanatory. There exist tools, ranging from open-sourced to enterprise-created, that can simulate
network communication from one end to another by sending data packets to a destination IP
address and test the state of said communication. The receiving end would then respond with an
acknowledgement (ACK) signal if communication has been successfully established or a
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negative acknowledgement (NACK) if an error occurred that prevents the packet from being
received. There is a distinct difference between a packet being dropped in its path and being
rejected by the endpoint due to firewall settings, for example. From this, the network tool would
measure the time it took for the test packet to reach the destination and the rate that the packet
hops in between devices to reach the destination.
The framework prototype started with the idea of running performance analyses varying
the settings of encryption algorithms for each VPN under the same devices. There are four main
test scenarios: one without defined security settings, one through IPsec from Palo Alto
equipment, one through SSL from OpenVPN, and one through PPTP from a Windows Server
VM. The VPN scenarios are to undergo additional testing between using predefined encryption
settings and using FIPS-enforced encryption settings, reaching a total of seven tests for each
client endpoint. These factors have been incorporated into the framework’s final development.

3.1.2

Network Measuring Tools
To test the network traffic, a tool is needed to measure and simulate the communicating

data stream from one end to the other. There were a variety of known open-sourced network
performance tools to select from that can get the job done as options included iperf, netperf,
nuttcp, and netpipe. Regarding scope and the capacity to measure network performance metrics,
these tools fit the basic qualifications for this research. Each one is capable of simulating data
streams through client and server agents, provided that both end points have the tool installed.
For the performance analyses, it was decided that the network metrics would be recorded
through the iperf v2 tool. Iperf is a free and open-sourced network performance tool that is easy
to learn after a few trials of experimentation. It can measure the interval, transfer, and bandwidth
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between devices. However, there is a distinct difference between iperf v2 and the rewritten iperf3
as the latter is not backwards compatible. The reason that the lower version of iperf was selected
in consideration for the Android platform involved in this research. The iperf v2 tool was found
to be the only compatible and available network performance measuring tool for said platform.
As for netperf and netpipe, while they were found to be compliant with Linux and most
UNIX-based systems, there were no feasible applications of them for Windows and Mac. While
this restriction is not necessarily a bad thing, the restriction kept in mind that the tool needed
operate well in Windows and Mac. The additional requirement is that the tool is available for
Android, in which there exists an iperf app as mentioned above.

Figure 3-2: Iperf Client and Server Interaction

In addition to selecting a pre-existing network performance measurement tool rather than
creating a tool with similar functionality, iperf was worked with mostly following previous
network-related projects, adding in the convenience of experience it provided. It was found that
developing methods to be best based from experience while learning about new tools and
technologies along the way in developing an effective methodology. The iperf tool is relatively
easy to utilize following download, simply by opening a Command Prompt or Terminal screen
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and executing the iperf command with the -s flag to open the iperf server agent on one device
while the -c flag uses the second device as an iperf client with the IP address the server client is
on accompanying the flag. Iperf results can also be outputted into a txt file by adding “>
[filename].txt” as part of the iperf command; it works for both the client and server commands.
Additional notes regarding iperf usage that should be known is that for this research, the iperf
client connects to the server via TCP port 5001 by default for all the involved platforms.

3.1.3

Framework Arrangement
The network map for this research was designed to operate separately and unaffected by

other network activity and traffic in the shared lab environment. The isolation would allow a
deeper study of the effects of VPN tunneling on network data packet transfer between server and
client. The main access point router in FAVE would only be hardwired to the Internet only in
cases that require outside resources, such as downloading tools and software patches. Otherwise,
the only machine the router would be wired is the ESXi environment containing the VPN VMs
while the client endpoints are permitted to connect wirelessly. The desktop server endpoint,
however, would be designated on a separate subnet to prevent the clients from circumventing the
VPN tunnels to connect straight to it. A fixed physical distance, d, is also established between
the client device and the wireless router to ensure that all clients use the same parameters during
the testing. See Figure 3-3 for visualization of the developed framework, including assigned IP
addresses for machines involved and the subnet range listed on the top left.
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Figure 3-3: FAVE Framework Detailing Basic Relations Between Endpoints and VPNs

The reason that the VPNs are to share the same local IP address is for ease of swapping
between VMs on top of consistency. Sharing the same IP address also maintains the integrity of
FAVE’s subnet assignments as altering a VM’s network interface tends to affect its behavior in
connecting with the rest of the network.

RQ-2: Determining Differences
To identify the probable difference in configuration between a vendor-supplied security
setting and a federal standard of validated encryption algorithms for a VPN infrastructure,
measurement parameters were decided to define obtainable variances. Measurement parameters
involved in this research include bandwidth, transfer rate, current secure best practices, and type
of platforms used.
All participating devices, personal or otherwise, are to adhere to the same ethical and
behavioral standards. The Palo Alto firewall and OpenVPN VM setup would be built according
to the basic and necessary functionalities as recorded on official documentations. These VMs,
along with the Windows Server VM running a PPTP VPN, would be stored into a VMware ESXi
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hypervisor. As previously illustrated in Figure 3-3, the ESXi hypervisor manages the VMs,
permitting VMs to be active or suspended depending on which VPN requires testing during the
experimentation period.
However, to ensure the flow of network traffic pushes through the designated active
VPN’s tunnel, the VPN VMs have been configured to utilize the same static IP address and host
the default gateway for the desktop server in a spare virtual ethernet interface. Otherwise, due to
the arrangement of the isolated network, the iperf testing would circumvent the VPN tunneling to
reach the corresponding endpoint in the desktop server.

3.2.1

Network Traffic Monitoring
There are plenty of open-sourced network measuring tools and graphical user interfaces

(GUIs) available to select and perform the data gathering. However, as discussed previously, the
use of the iperf tool is enough to measure the likes of bandwidth and transfer rate for each VPN
connection the platforms participate in.
Iperf is open-sourced and versatile in its functionality, from allowing a finite number of
tested intervals to be performed consecutively to sending a file of a fixed number of bytes from
client to server. The server agent is active by executing the tool with the -s flag while the client
side is voluntarily activated by -c followed by the IP address where the active server is located.
The “-c <server address>” argument alone measures the bandwidth and transfer rate for an
interval of ten seconds by default.
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Figure 3-4: Example of Windows Iperf Client Agent Connected to Active Server Agent

Specifically, for this research, iperf tests are set to a minimum of twenty consecutive tests
with each interval measuring ten seconds each. The transfer rates from all intervals are added up
while the twenty bandwidth results are averaged. This iperf command is performed with
arguments “-t 200 -i 10” on the client side, in which the t flag defines the total length of time
while the i flag defines the interval length within the time total. To preserve the results from the
performance tests, iperf can export and save them if the “>” syntax is used at the end of the
command followed by the location and name of the file to save as, preferably into a simple txt
file.
To validate the collected data, fixed transfer tests of one-hundred megabytes are
performed at least once for each VPN setting with one client device to determine byte overhead.
The Windows 10 client would be used for this case. The fixed transfer test is done with the “-n
105000000” argument. The purpose for this iperf command is to help monitor the byte rate
traveling through VPN tunnels.
The actual packet monitoring would be performed through the interface of a ProLiant
DL165 G6 Basic SATA containing the SecurityOnion software; both the router and the ESXi
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box are hardwired to it. If setting up SecurityOnion for the first time, follow the production
deployment instructions available on the Security Onion wiki, starting with the standard “sudo
apt-get update” before installing the meta-package itself with “sudo apt-get -y install
securityonion-all syslog-ng-core”. The integral part to be able to monitor network traffic would
be configuring the /etc/network/interfaces file to build a bridge to listen from, as well as define
the two ethernets in use. See the Appendix B section for the exact configuration.
The packet monitoring and dumping is executed by tcpdump with the captured packets
saved into pcap files. The command used to measure most network streams is “tcpdump -i br0 w file.pcap”, wherein br0 is the bridge between ethernet connections, the ASUS Wireless Router
and the ESXi box, to listen traffic in.
Under a packet analysis software application, such as Wireshark, additional assurance
that the packet flow is forced over the VPN is guaranteed upon examining the pcap file’s data
conversations and checking the active ports. On Wireshark, load the pcap file, go to Statistics,
and select Conversations to view the port communications and number of bytes transferred. In
this case, TCP port 443 is highly sought after while the appearance of TCP port 5001, the default
port used by the iperf server agent to listen upon, would indicate the packets circumventing the
VPN tunnel and traveling to the destination directly through the isolated network instead.
Following the data gathering, appropriate comparisons would be drawn between
measurements respective to their fields before drawing conclusions on the best course of actions
of finding the optimal balance between network speed and security for personal devices
connecting to a VPN through hardening procedures and best practices.
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3.2.2

VPN Infrastructure Settings
The three different VPN infrastructures presented in this research are each running

separate security protocols, varying by encryption use and traffic regulation. With each VPN
defined differently by protocol, the tuning factors between their default security settings and
FIPS-applied encryptions should be carefully defined for clear results. Evaluating the
infrastructures individually before performing network tests would provide the insight,
understanding, and direction needed on developing a balanced application between network
speed and security from available configurations.
Palo Alto Networks uses GlobalProtect Gateway as its network security platform for
devices connected to its VPN while its firewall interface operates it from a distance. Its default
security protocol is IPsec. GlobalProtect uses IPsec Crypto Profiles to specify authentication and
encryption algorithms. The default algorithms for encryption from most-to-least secure are AES256-GCM, AES-128-GCM, and AES-128-CBC. The GlobalProtect agent is applicable for
Windows, Mac, Linux, and Android platforms. The VPN agent for Windows and Mac for this
project were available upon configuring the portal to an accessible IP address within the test
network environment. Lastly, there is an official GlobalProtect app available on the Google Play
Store by Palo Alto Networks for the Android to utilize. However, for the Android to connect to
the VPN through the app, the active Palo Alto firewall must be authenticated with a license key.
The ova file was provided for this project from the beginning, but no license key as its absence
won’t entirely affect the network performance of the VPN.
The steps of configuring a Palo Alto firewall VM are straightforward upon learning
where to look for the necessary features to configure. The default credentials to access its web
GUI uses the word “admin” as both the username and password, but for a FIPS-CC move Palo
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Alto firewall, the password is “paloalto” instead. Many steps in setting the firewall are available
on the Palo Alto Network’s live community website, but the necessary steps to configure the
firewall are listed here.
The firewall should be installed from a provided ova file into VMware ESXi or a similar
virtual machine hypervisor. Once the installation is finished, open the console to begin
configuring the VM by providing a static IP address to be used for the management interface. It
can be assigned 192.168.42.10 as the GlobalProtect portal is going to use 192.168.42.2. In the
console, enter configure mode by typing in “configure” and tapping the Enter button. Then enter
these following commands, substituting the tags with necessary information:
•

set deviceconfig system type static

•

set deviceconfig system ip-address <ip-address> netmask <netmask> default-gateway
<default-gateway> dns-setting servers primary <dns-servers>

•

commit

•

exit
Verify the network information with “show system info” before opening an Internet

browser and visiting the firewall’s GUI via the static IP address entered from the previous steps.
After logging in with the default credentials, the first simple step is to create self-signed chain of
certificates to use for security profiles for later configurations, as well as export to the Windows
and Mac clients to save as a trusted source. This is done by selecting the Device tab and clicking
the Certificate Manager on the side option bar. Select the Generate button below to begin
creating the root certificate; fill in the Certificate and Common Name fields, to check Certificate
Authority, and proceed to generate. The intermediate certificate follows the same steps except
the Signed By dropdown box should select the root certificate. Lastly, the server certificate to be
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used in the SSL/TLS Profile should have its Common Name specify the designated portal IP
address, which would be 192.168.42.2, not have the Certificate Authority box checked, and have
an IP = 192.168.42.2 Certificate Attribute field added for client devices to trust. Commit changes
frequently after making a significant addition or edit to the firewall configuration.
The next major step in configuring the Palo Alto firewall would be to set up its virtual
ethernet interfaces so that one interface can serve as the GlobalProtect VPN portal while another
ethernet interface can operate as the 192.168.43.0 gateway for the desktop server. Beforehand,
two interface management profiles, one Layer 3 trust zone, and one virtual router should be
created for the virtual ethernets to use. These can all be found upon selecting the Network tab on
top while the options are found along the side menu. The trust zone can be created in the Zone
option with the only configuration outside of naming it is to select Layer 3 as its Type before
creating it. Starting with the Interface Management option, create a profile with permitted
services ping, ssh, https, and response pages and name it “allow-mgt”. Create a second profile
with only ping as the permitted service with the name “allow-ping” to signify its limited rights.
In the Virtual Routers option, create a virtual router with the only necessary configuration being
in the Static Routes tab. Add a static route for the virtual router to use by default, defining it with
IPv4 address 0.0.0.0/0 as the destination and using GlobalProtect portal address 192.168.42.2 as
the next hop.
After creating the three services and committing the changes, select the Interfaces option
while still in the Network section of the Palo Alto firewall. Select a virtual ethernet, Ethernet 1/1
for example, to configure into the 192.168.43.0 gateway. This and the second ethernet, Ethether
1/2, are both Layer 3 types. Set the virtual router and zone to the router and zone created from
the previous steps. Input 192.168.43.1/24 into the IPv4 tab. On the Advanced tab, select “allow-
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ping” for the interface management before accepting the configurations. Perform the same steps
with Ethernet 1/2, but use 192.168.42.2/24 for the IPv4 section as this interface is to be used for
the GlobalProtect portal.
The final major step is to configure the GlobalProtect gateway and portal, both located on
the side menu while in the Network tab. Create the portal by implementing the main interface to
be Ethernet 1/2 and its static IP range, 192.168.42.2/24 on the General tab. In the Authentication
tab, select the SSL/TLS Profile created earlier and create an entry for Client Authentication using
local authentication. Under the Agent tab, create the agent config; within the config window,
check the box to generate and accept cookies while setting the root certificate to encrypt/decrypt
the cookies. Go to Add External to input the portal IP address, 192.168.42.2. Lastly, go to App
and select “On-Demand” for manual portal login. The gateway configuration, located next to the
portal option on the side menu, follows the same configuration as the portal. The Agent tab for
the gateway, however, should have tunnel mode and IPsec enabled, add in the IP range
192.168.0.0 – 192.168.255.255 for Client Settings, and input a range in the IP pool for the
firewall to pull from for clients. The range can be provided in the 192.168.43.0 network, an
example being 192.168.43.20 – 192.168.43.50.
Commit the changes for the configurations to take effect. To add a user to login to the
portal upon visiting 192.168.42.2 on a web browser, go to Device and select Local User
Database to manually add a username and password to login to the web portal. The portal page,
upon successfully logging in, allows GlobalProtect VPN agents for Windows and Mac to be
downloaded and used to connect to the VPN freely.
For a Palo Alto VM to switch from its normal organization mode to FIPS and Common
Criteria (FIPS-CC) support, the configuration must be done on the VM’s terminal on a VMware
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application, such as the ESXi’s main webpage or a console via the VMware vSphere Client
software. A precaution to note regarding switching to FIPS-CC mode causes the VM to reset to
factory settings, which is why a second Palo Alto firewall VM is recommended for this purpose
while alternating with the first firewall in normal mode during testing. The mode switch is done
by inputting “debug system maintenance-mode” into the console to boot up the Maintenance
Recovery Tool (MRT). The MRT interface then shows a selection of choices, one of which is to
set FIPS-CC mode. The process is overall straightforward and takes a few minutes for the change
to complete, depending on how much space within the virtual environment is available. Once
FIPS-CC mode is fully operational, it can be configured the same way as a normal mode firewall
can using virtually the same steps as mentioned.
Regarding the OpenVPN server, it was within scope to create it from scratch using an
Ubuntu Server 17.04 VM. The OpenVPN server is relatively easy to setup, given that there are
plenty step-by-step setup guides available online to follow, such as the guide provided by Digital
Ocean. Although the webpage recommended the setup for Ubuntu 16.04, it was still applicable
on the 17.04 version. OpenVPN openly supports SSL as its main implementation instead of
IPsec or PPTP due to portability, ease of configuration, and compatibility with NAT and
dynamic addresses. OpenVPN utilizes User Datagram Protocol (UDP) packets, which uses
checksums for data integrity but is otherwise connectionless as to reach the destination endpoint
without being slowed by handshakes and other overhead accumulating processes compared to
TCP. However, specific configuration can permit OpenVPN to use TCP port 443, the commonly
used port for secure tunneling. This OpenVPN also uses the AES-256 cipher instead of the AES128 the website recommends mainly because the base.conf file has the 256 cipher in place from
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installation. Check the Appendix section at the end for files to edit and configure for OpenVPN
use.
For OpenVPN to utilize FIPS, OpenSSL and the FIPS Object Module are required as
they work conjointly. It would be best to build the OpenSSL module alongside the FIPS Object
Module as the former needs to be compatible for the latter to force the server to use FIPSapproved encryption algorithms. The FIPS Object Module can be downloaded via the wget
command from the OpenSSL website and unpackage with the gunzip and tar commands:
•

wget https://www.openssl.org/source/openssl-fips-2.0.16.tar.gz

•

gunzip -c openssl-fips-2.0.16.tar.gz | tar xf –
Once the tar.gz file is unpackaged, enter the newly created openssl-fips-2.0.16 folder to

begin configuring the FIPS module (OpenSSL Software Foundation, 2017). Run the config script
in the folder to build up the module for the VM to use.
Repeat the process in downloading an OpenSSL file from the same website, but with the
package openssl-1.0.2o.tar.gz instead when reusing the commands. The OpenSSL community
has stated that the 2.0 FIPS module is fully compatible with either the 1.0.1 or 1.0.2 versions of
OpenSSL, meaning it is safe to continue installing the module by running the config file
following its unpackaging. Upon full installation of OpenSSL, check the version the VM
environment is using with the “openssl version” command. If the system returns “fips” in its
version, example being OpenSSL 1.0.2o-fips 23 followed by the date of installation, then the
system can enable FIPS mode. Set environment variable “OPENSSL_FIPS=1” by the export
command; the 1 variable enables FIPS while 0 turns it off. The test to check that FIPS is working
under OpenSSL is to check the hash of a file with MD5 using the command “openssl md5
[file.txt]”. MD5 is not FIPS-approved, meaning the system should return an error setting the
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digest. SHA1, on the other hand, is FIPS-approved, meaning that the FIPS module is enforcing
the system as it should when enabled.
The applications of setting up the OpenVPN client endpoints differed with each platform.
Windows 10 required installing the client from the OpenVPN website, creating the config folder
in the C:\Program Files\OpenVPN file path, and utilizing a File Transfer Protocol (FTP)
application to drag the opvn file from the Ubuntu Server into the config folder. Mac OS required
the installation of the open-sourced Tunnelblick application to perform OpenVPN tasks and like
Windows, requires the opvn file to be dropped into Tunnelblick to establish the VPN connection.
However, in the context of this research, for Tunnelblick to accept the configuration file, the
ta.key file was required to be in the same directory as the dragged opvn file.
The process on Ubuntu Linux is straightforward via Terminal by typing in the “sudo aptget update” and “sudo apt-get install openvpn” commands. The opvn file, in this case, can be
dropped anywhere as long as the “sudo openvpn --config [filename].opvn” can be executed to
establish the connection. The Android platform has both the OpenVPN Connect and OpenVPN
for Android apps to be a suitable client to use the opvn file and successfully connect to the server.
It should be noted that the former requires the same instruction as Mac’s Tunnelblick in
including both the opvn file and the ta.key file in the same directory to allow the Android to
connect to the VPN server, at least within the parameters of this research, while the latter is able
to work with simply importing the opvn file alone.
Lastly, the VM running PPTP is installed through Windows’s Server Manager. The VPN
is installed through the Remote Access server role with the DirectAccess and VPN (RAS)
service. Upon installing the features, click on the following link for the Getting Started Wizard to
configure the server, starting with the Deploy VPN Only option. The Routing and Remote
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Access Management Console opens, wherein the newly deployed server’s configuration can be
customizable. The only service to enable in the customization is VPN access. Upon finishing the
steps and starting the Routing and Remote Access service, right-click on the server to access
Properties, head to the IPv4 tab, and add a range of IP addresses into the static address pool for
the VPN to assign clients with. Considering that the VPN VM is within the 192.168.42.0 subnet,
it is acceptable to input a static range within the 192.168.43.0 subnet.
Enabling and disabling FIPS on Windows Server is also a straightforward process, done
by opening the Local Security Policy console and navigating on the side directory through Local
Policies and Security Options. In the Policy table, locate “System cryptography: Use FIPS
compliant algorithms for encryption, hashing, and signing” and right-click on it to access
Properties. Select Enabled or Disabled, apply the change, and restart the VM for it to take effect.
With PPTP as a legacy protocol, most devices can utilize it by registering the VPN
connection through a device’s respective wireless and network settings. One glaring exception to
this would be Mac’s capacity to cooperate with Windows applications. Certain Mac operating
systems, such as the macOS Sierra through later patches, have removed the option to form a
PPTP VPN connection due to PPTP’s lack of defined security settings. As a remedy to this issue,
there are VPN software available online, ranging from free open-sourced to purchasable
enterprise applications with free trial periods, that can permit the mentioned Mac OSs to form a
PPTP connection. Available applications include Flow VPN, Shimo, and VPN Tracker; Flow
VPN is free and open-sourced while the last two provide free thirty-day trial periods before
requiring a paid subscription to use all features.
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RH-2: Bandwidth Differences
With FAVE’s development and the configurations to test for each VPN server, there is
the matter of understanding the underlying factors that affect the bandwidth and transfer rate
results. On top of testing network speed and connectivity between device endpoints for each
VPN server, security must be enforced on personal devices. The iperf results provide
benchmarks to determine the tuning parameters necessary in upholding the ideal balance
between speed and security.

3.3.1

Device Information
The following information relays the hardware and configurations used for this project in

forming the framework. The first half details the router, hard drives, VMs, and their
software/firmware configurations. The router serves as the default gateway for the 192.168.42.0
subnet, one hard drive hosts the VMware ESXi holding the VPN VMs, and a second hard drive
is set aside as the desktop hosting the iperf server agent.
•

ASUS RT-AC68U Wireless Router, 5GHz, IP address 192.168.42.1

•

HP ProLiant DL165 G6 Server Basic SATA with 4 Proliant DL165 G6 Storage Drives,
RAID 10, SecurityOnion Ubuntu 14.04.5

•

Dell OptiPlex 9020 with 4 CPUs x Intel® Core™ i5-4670 CPU @ 3.40 GHz, 15.91 GB
memory with ESXi v6.5.0-standard, IP address 192.168.42.4
o Palo Alto v8.0.5
o Ubuntu Server 17.04 hosting OpenVPN
o Windows Server 2016 hosting PPTP VPN service
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•

Dell OptiPlex 9020 x64-based PC hard drive hosting Windows Server 2016, Intel64
Family 6 Model 60 Stepping 3 GenuineIntel ~800 Mhz processor, IP address
192.168.43.250
For the second hard drive that was meant to serve as the iperf server agent to operate in

the 192.168.43.0 network, the above VPN VMs were configured to permit open virtual ethernet
interfaces to operate as the 43 subnet’s default gateway. The VPNs, active one at a time with the
other VMs suspended, were assigned 192.168.42.2 as the local static IP while their additional
virtual ethernets were assigned 192.168.43.1. The two hard drives were hardwired into a switch
to allow a firm connection for this network relation. As for the client endpoint devices involved
in this research, they include the following hardware and operating system information.
•

Microsoft Surface Book with Windows 10 Professional x64 based OS, Intel64 Family 6
Model 78 Stepping 3 GenuineIntel ~2396 MHz processor, 8118 MB physical memory,
9398 MB virtual memory, and five NICs.

•

MacOS Sierra Version 10.12.3, iMac (27-inch, Mid 2010), 2.93 GHz Intel Core i7
processor, 16 GB evenly split into four 1333 MHz DDR3 memory modules, and an ATI
Radeon HD 5750 1024 MB graphics card.

•

Samsung Galaxy S7 Edge (Verizon) [SM-G935V], Android v7.0 OS, kernel version
3.18.31, hardware version REV0.7, 2.1 GHz Qualcomm MSM8996 Snapdragon 820
processor, 4.0 GB memory RAM, 32 GB storage, and four security software applications.

3.3.2

Tuning Factors
The purpose of FAVE is to define VPN parameters according to the needs of a network

entity, hence determine favored settings. The needs generally scale between wanting a speedy
43

response between network communications to encrypting every data packet passing through for
extra protection. VPNs would have to accommodate to a good variety of client devices just if the
clients themselves can establish connections to the VPN they are signing into. The framework is
essentially mindful of all participants, given the settings are adjusted accordingly.
There is a checklist of tuning factors to watch out for. These items include network
topology, device arrangement, choice of encryption, and partitioned system resources among
clients. For repeatability, it is prudent for the researcher or network administrator to maintain a
level of consistency upon setting up a framework like FAVE to test different VPN structures.
The layout of the framework’s networks must be drawn out to clearly understand the
packet machinations between server and client. This includes participating subnets, IP address
assignments, and defined gateways. The hardware aspect of forming a VPN-tuning framework is
also significant in the sense that the server devices and main router would need to be hardwired
together while preserving the subnet schema. This also applies to personal devices representing
the client side of the topology as their participation suggests the necessary configurations for
VPNs to allow clients of different platforms and operating systems to join in the first place.
Within a VPN itself lies the possibilities of implementing settings such as firewall rules
and encryption algorithms. While the use of firewalls would permit or deny certain IP addresses
and ports, the focus lies upon choice of encryption. The choices of encryption can fall upon the
provided defaults recommended by the VPN make or follow the encryption algorithms strictly
enforced under FIPS settings.
Lastly, the VPNs themselves would need to be given an equal share of resources in
whichever virtual environment they are stationed in for the framework to provide tuning insights,
though it is recommended to use VMware ESXi to store and manage the VPN VMs due to its
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ease of use. This is because integral details such as CPU memory, core processors, and related
can affect VPN VM performance, such as increased bandwidth within short intervals of time
because of the VPN struggling to forward the packets between client and server in a sensible
manner.

45

4

RESULTS & ANALYSIS

FAVE consists of two primary components, the iperf tool collecting network traffic data
from different platforms upon connecting to different VPN architectures and the security
measures derived from data analysis by my own research and expertise compared to a few best
practices currently publicized regarding the hardening of personal devices. This chapter explains
in detail the construction of this framework’s mechanics and the results brought about running
the iperf tool to collect the VPN traffic performance for each machine involved.

Data Collection
The collection of data has been manually harvested through executing the iperf server
and client agents between the four main platforms: Windows 10, macOS Sierra, and Android
mobile. Data from the default settings of each VPN server, as well as under FIPS-defined
settings when applicable, has been collected. At different intervals during the research period, the
devices had established connections with the following VPN setups:
•

Palo Alto GlobalProtect using IPsec and AES-256 encryption.

•

OpenVPN using SSL and AES-256 encryption on an Ubuntu Server 17.04 VM.

•

A Windows Server 2016 VM running a PPTP server.
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The raw data collection is in the following subsection while the analysis of the collected
data plus calculated standard deviation, specifically Figure 4-1 and Figure 4-2, is in the next
section of the chapter.

4.1.1

Fixed Transfer Bandwidth
To determine any significant changes in network speeds between these VPNs, a

benchmark is provided in iperf sending a fixed transfer of 100 MBytes over connections with no
connections to a VPN and with connections through the featured VPNs. This is performed by
tcpdump through the Windows client device to monitor the bytes during communication,
ensuring that they are going over the VPN. Typically, the client address would be viewed using
TCP port 5001, iperf’s default communication, but when logged into a VPN, the communicating
port is expected to be TCP port 443, or UDP port 1194 for OpenVPN using UDP traffic. See
Table 4.1 to view produced bytes per frame produced by each fixed file.

Table 4.1: Fixed Transfer Results
Setting

Interval

Transfer

Bandwidth

Bytes per Frame

No VPN

0.0 – 4.0 sec

100 MBytes

211 Mbits/sec

106 MBytes

Palo Alto, No
FIPS

0.0 – 6.2 sec

100 MBytes

136 Mbits/sec

118 MBytes

Palo Alto, FIPS

0.0 – 846.7 sec

100 MBytes

993 Kbits/sec

117 MBytes

OpenVPN, No
FIPS

0.0 – 13.2 sec

100 MBytes

85.6 Mbits/sec

125 MBytes

OpenVPN, FIPS

0.0 – 13.3 sec

100 MBytes

82.1 Mbits/sec

122 MBytes

PPTP, No FIPS

0.0 – 11.1 sec

100 MBytes

75.7 Mbits/sec

115 MBytes

PPTP, FIPS

0.0 – 14.0 sec

100 MBytes

60.0 Mbits/sec

115 MBytes
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4.1.2

Windows Client Results
Performance tests on a Windows 10 client have revealed strong consistency between all

twenty ten-second intervals for each setting. See Table 4.2 for the first iperf test communicating
to the server within the isolated network’s reach, no VPN involved or active during the twohundred seconds the testing took place. See Table 4.3 for the iperf tests on the Palo Alto VMs,
differentiated by the fact that one VM is in normal mode while the other is in FIPS-CC mode.
See Table 4.4 for the iperf tests conducted on OpenVPN with OpenSSL FIPS Object Module
disabled and enabled. See Table 4.5 for the iperf tests results done through the Windows PPTP
server with the FIPS policy disabled and enabled.

Table 4.2: Windows Client Iperf Results with No VPN
Interval
0.0-10.0 sec
10.0-20.0 sec
20.0-30.0 sec
30.0-40.0 sec
40.0-50.0 sec
50.0-60.0 sec
60.0-70.0 sec
70.0-80.0 sec
80.0-90.0 sec
90.0-100.0 sec
100.0-110.0 sec
110.0-120.0 sec
120.0-130.0 sec
130.0-140.0 sec
140.0-150.0 sec
150.0-160.0 sec
160.0-170.0 sec
170.0-180.0 sec
180.0-190.0 sec
190.0-200.0 sec
0.0-200.0 sec

Transfer
241 MBytes
238 MBytes
240 MBytes
240 MBytes
243 MBytes
241 MBytes
240 MBytes
238 MBytes
235 MBytes
232 MBytes
234 MBytes
234 MBytes
260 MBytes
262 MBytes
260 MBytes
272 MBytes
266 MBytes
263 MBytes
264 MBytes
266 MBytes
Total
4.85 GBytes
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Bandwidth
202 Mbits/sec
200 Mbits/sec
202 Mbits/sec
201 Mbits/sec
204 Mbits/sec
202 Mbits/sec
201 Mbits/sec
200 Mbits/sec
197 Mbits/sec
195 Mbits/sec
197 Mbits/sec
197 Mbits/sec
218 Mbits/sec
219 Mbits/sec
218 Mbits/sec
228 Mbits/sec
223 Mbits/sec
221 Mbits/sec
221 Mbits/sec
223 Mbits/sec
Average
208 Mbits/sec

Table 4.3: Windows Client Iperf Results Using Palo Alto VPN

Interval
0.0-10.0 sec
10.0-20.0 sec
20.0-30.0 sec
30.0-40.0 sec
40.0-50.0 sec
50.0-60.0 sec
60.0-70.0 sec
70.0-80.0 sec
80.0-90.0 sec
90.0-100.0 sec
100.0-110.0 sec
110.0-120.0 sec
120.0-130.0 sec
130.0-140.0 sec
140.0-150.0 sec
150.0-160.0 sec
160.0-170.0 sec
170.0-180.0 sec
180.0-190.0 sec
190.0-200.0 sec
0.0-200.0 sec

No FIPS
Transfer
Bandwidth
160 MBytes 135 Mbits/sec
169 MBytes 142 Mbits/sec
171 MBytes 143 Mbits/sec
174 MBytes 146 Mbits/sec
177 MBytes 149 Mbits/sec
170 MBytes 143 Mbits/sec
164 MBytes 137 Mbits/sec
171 MBytes 144 Mbits/sec
172 MBytes 144 Mbits/sec
159 MBytes 133 Mbits/sec
168 MBytes 141 Mbits/sec
169 MBytes 142 Mbits/sec
171 MBytes 144 Mbits/sec
176 MBytes 147 Mbits/sec
167 MBytes 140 Mbits/sec
172 MBytes 144 Mbits/sec
176 MBytes 148 Mbits/sec
163 MBytes 137 Mbits/sec
170 MBytes 143 Mbits/sec
169 MBytes 142 Mbits/sec
Total
Average
3.31 GBytes 142 Mbits/sec
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FIPS
Transfer
Bandwidth
1.00 MBytes 839 Kbits/sec
1.00 MBytes 839 Kbits/sec
768 KBytes 629 Kbits/sec
640 KBytes 524 Kbits/sec
512 KBytes 419 Kbits/sec
1.25 MBytes 1.05 Mbits/sec
1.12 MBytes 944 Kbits/sec
1.25 MBytes 1.05 Mbits/sec
1.12 MBytes 944 Kbits/sec
1.12 MBytes 944 Kbits/sec
1.38 MBytes 1.15 Mbits/sec
1.12 MBytes 944 Kbits/sec
1.25 MBytes 1.05 Mbits/sec
1.38 MBytes 1.15 Mbits/sec
1.12 MBytes 944 Kbits/sec
1.12 MBytes 944 Kbits/sec
1.12 MBytes 944 Kbits/sec
1.12 MBytes 944 Kbits/sec
1.12 MBytes 944 Kbits/sec
1.25 MBytes 1.05 Mbits/sec
Total
Average
21.8 MBytes 906 Kbits/sec

Table 4.4: Windows Client Iperf Results Using OpenVPN

Interval
0.0-10.0 sec
10.0-20.0 sec
20.0-30.0 sec
30.0-40.0 sec
40.0-50.0 sec
50.0-60.0 sec
60.0-70.0 sec
70.0-80.0 sec
80.0-90.0 sec
90.0-100.0 sec
100.0-110.0 sec
110.0-120.0 sec
120.0-130.0 sec
130.0-140.0 sec
140.0-150.0 sec
150.0-160.0 sec
160.0-170.0 sec
170.0-180.0 sec
180.0-190.0 sec
190.0-200.0 sec
0.0-200.0 sec

No FIPS
Transfer
Bandwidth
117 MBytes 98.5 Mbits/sec
122 MBytes 103 Mbits/sec
118 MBytes 99.3 Mbits/sec
122 MBytes 102 Mbits/sec
123 MBytes 103 Mbits/sec
111 MBytes 93.0 Mbits/sec
106 MBytes 88.6 Mbits/sec
108 MBytes 90.5 Mbits/sec
112 MBytes 93.7 Mbits/sec
119 MBytes 100 Mbits/sec
110 MBytes 92.7 Mbits/sec
115 MBytes 96.7 Mbits/sec
107 MBytes 89.8 Mbits/sec
122 MBytes 102 Mbits/sec
114 MBytes 95.8 Mbits/sec
118 MBytes 99.3 Mbits/sec
122 MBytes 102 Mbits/sec
123 MBytes 103 Mbits/sec
120 MBytes 101 Mbits/sec
121 MBytes 102 Mbits/sec
Total
Average
2.28 GBytes 97.8 Mbits/sec
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FIPS
Transfer
Bandwidth
107 MBytes 88.5 Mbits/sec
110 MBytes 90.5 Mbits/sec
110 MBytes 90.0 Mbits/sec
102 MBytes 92.6 Mbits/sec
101 MBytes 91.4 Mbits/sec
111 MBytes 92.7 Mbits/sec
122 MBytes 92.1 Mbits/sec
110 MBytes 90.5 Mbits/sec
110 MBytes 92.7 Mbits/sec
109 MBytes 90.0 Mbits/sec
107 MBytes 89.8 Mbits/sec
110 MBytes 91.7 Mbits/sec
112 MBytes 93.7 Mbits/sec
106 MBytes 88.6 Mbits/sec
108 MBytes 89.8 Mbits/sec
110 MBytes 90.9 Mbits/sec
110 MBytes 91.5 Mbits/sec
107 MBytes 87.3 Mbits/sec
110 MBytes 91.3 Mbits/sec
109 MBytes 89.4 Mbits/sec
Total
Average
2.58 GBytes 90.7 Mbits/sec

Table 4.5: Windows Client Iperf Results Using Windows Server VPN (PPTP)

Interval
0.0-10.0 sec
10.0-20.0 sec
20.0-30.0 sec
30.0-40.0 sec
40.0-50.0 sec
50.0-60.0 sec
60.0-70.0 sec
70.0-80.0 sec
80.0-90.0 sec
90.0-100.0 sec
100.0-110.0 sec
110.0-120.0 sec
120.0-130.0 sec
130.0-140.0 sec
140.0-150.0 sec
150.0-160.0 sec
160.0-170.0 sec
170.0-180.0 sec
180.0-190.0 sec
190.0-200.0 sec
0.0-200.0 sec

4.1.3

No FIPS
Transfer
Bandwidth
105 MBytes 88.1 Mbits/sec
92.6 MBytes 77.7 Mbits/sec
98.2 MBytes 82.4 Mbits/sec
108 MBytes 90.4 Mbits/sec
103 MBytes 86.4 Mbits/sec
101 MBytes 84.7 Mbits/sec
93.2 MBytes 78.2 Mbits/sec
105 MBytes 88.1 Mbits/sec
110 MBytes 92.5 Mbits/sec
112 MBytes 94.2 Mbits/sec
115 MBytes 96.5 Mbits/sec
111 MBytes 93.1 Mbits/sec
116 MBytes 97.5 Mbits/sec
99.8 MBytes 83.7 Mbits/sec
80.6 MBytes 67.6 Mbits/sec
97.1 MBytes 81.5 Mbits/sec
106 MBytes 89.1 Mbits/sec
98.4 MBytes 82.5 Mbits/sec
114 MBytes 95.5 Mbits/sec
106 MBytes 89.0 Mbits/sec
Total
Average
2.02 GBytes 86.9 Mbits/sec

FIPS
Transfer
Bandwidth
119 MBytes 99.5 Mbits/sec
112 MBytes 94.0 Mbits/sec
116 MBytes 97.0 Mbits/sec
120 MBytes 101 Mbits/sec
112 MBytes 94.3 Mbits/sec
111 MBytes 93.4 Mbits/sec
109 MBytes 91.5 Mbits/sec
109 MBytes 91.4 Mbits/sec
113 MBytes 94.9 Mbits/sec
93.4 MBytes 78.3 Mbits/sec
94.9 MBytes 79.6 Mbits/sec
108 MBytes 90.3 Mbits/sec
102 MBytes 85.8 Mbits/sec
104 MBytes 87.0 Mbits/sec
103 MBytes 86.2 Mbits/sec
124 MBytes 104 Mbits/sec
110 MBytes 91.9 Mbits/sec
123 MBytes 103 Mbits/sec
116 MBytes 97.3 Mbits/sec
117 MBytes 98.5 Mbits/sec
Total
Average
2.16 GBytes 92.9 Mbits/sec

Mac Client Results
The network performance tests on the macOS Sierra client yielded significantly strong

consistency in its intervals for nearly all settings. See Table 4.6 for the iperf test communicating
to the server agent with no VPN involved. See Table 4.7 for the iperf tests on the Palo Alto VMs.
See Table 4.8 for the iperf tests conducted on OpenVPN. See Table 4.9 for the iperf tests results
done through the Windows PPTP server.
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Table 4.6: Mac Client Iperf Results with No VPN
Interval
0.0-10.0 sec
10.0-20.0 sec
20.0-30.0 sec
30.0-40.0 sec
40.0-50.0 sec
50.0-60.0 sec
60.0-70.0 sec
70.0-80.0 sec
80.0-90.0 sec
90.0-100.0 sec
100.0-110.0 sec
110.0-120.0 sec
120.0-130.0 sec
130.0-140.0 sec
140.0-150.0 sec
150.0-160.0 sec
160.0-170.0 sec
170.0-180.0 sec
180.0-190.0 sec
190.0-200.0 sec
0.0-200.0 sec

Transfer
220 MBytes
220 MBytes
220 MBytes
219 MBytes
219 MBytes
220 MBytes
221 MBytes
219 MBytes
216 MBytes
218 MBytes
217 MBytes
220 MBytes
202 MBytes
202 MBytes
202 MBytes
201 MBytes
199 MBytes
202 MBytes
199 MBytes
203 MBytes
Total
4.14 GBytes
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Bandwidth
184 Mbits/sec
184 Mbits/sec
185 Mbits/sec
184 Mbits/sec
184 Mbits/sec
185 Mbits/sec
185 Mbits/sec
184 Mbits/sec
181 Mbits/sec
183 Mbits/sec
182 Mbits/sec
184 Mbits/sec
169 Mbits/sec
169 Mbits/sec
170 Mbits/sec
168 Mbits/sec
167 Mbits/sec
169 Mbits/sec
167 Mbits/sec
170 Mbits/sec
Average
178 Mbits/sec

Table 4.7: Mac Client Iperf Results Using Palo Alto VPN

Interval
0.0-10.0 sec
10.0-20.0 sec
20.0-30.0 sec
30.0-40.0 sec
40.0-50.0 sec
50.0-60.0 sec
60.0-70.0 sec
70.0-80.0 sec
80.0-90.0 sec
90.0-100.0 sec
100.0-110.0 sec
110.0-120.0 sec
120.0-130.0 sec
130.0-140.0 sec
140.0-150.0 sec
150.0-160.0 sec
160.0-170.0 sec
170.0-180.0 sec
180.0-190.0 sec
190.0-200.0 sec
0.0-200.0 sec

No FIPS
Transfer
Bandwidth
192 MBytes 161 Mbits/sec
191 MBytes 160 Mbits/sec
192 MBytes 161 Mbits/sec
194 MBytes 163 Mbits/sec
188 MBytes 158 Mbits/sec
193 MBytes 162 Mbits/sec
196 MBytes 164 Mbits/sec
196 MBytes 164 Mbits/sec
194 MBytes 163 Mbits/sec
190 MBytes 159 Mbits/sec
195 MBytes 163 Mbits/sec
194 MBytes 163 Mbits/sec
193 MBytes 162 Mbits/sec
193 MBytes 162 Mbits/sec
196 MBytes 164 Mbits/sec
198 MBytes 166 Mbits/sec
196 MBytes 164 Mbits/sec
196 MBytes 165 Mbits/sec
194 MBytes 163 Mbits/sec
194 MBytes 163 Mbits/sec
Total
Average
3.78 GBytes 162 Mbits/sec
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FIPS
Transfer
Bandwidth
768 KBytes 629 Kbits/sec
768 KBytes 629 Kbits/sec
640 KBytes 524 Kbits/sec
640 KBytes 524 Kbits/sec
768 KBytes 629 Kbits/sec
896 KBytes 734 Kbits/sec
1.00 MBytes 839 Kbits/sec
1.00 MBytes 839 Kbits/sec
1.12 MBytes 944 Kbits/sec
1.00 MBytes 839 Kbits/sec
1.00 MBytes 839 Kbits/sec
1.12 MBytes 944 Kbits/sec
1.12 MBytes 944 Kbits/sec
1.12 MBytes 944 Kbits/sec
1.00 MBytes 839 Kbits/sec
1.12 MBytes 944 Kbits/sec
1.00 MBytes 839 Kbits/sec
1.00 MBytes 839 Kbits/sec
1.12 MBytes 944 Kbits/sec
1.12 MBytes 944 Kbits/sec
Total
Average
19.4 MBytes 810 Kbits/sec

Table 4.8: Mac Client Iperf Results Using OpenVPN

Interval
0.0-10.0 sec
10.0-20.0 sec
20.0-30.0 sec
30.0-40.0 sec
40.0-50.0 sec
50.0-60.0 sec
60.0-70.0 sec
70.0-80.0 sec
80.0-90.0 sec
90.0-100.0 sec
100.0-110.0 sec
110.0-120.0 sec
120.0-130.0 sec
130.0-140.0 sec
140.0-150.0 sec
150.0-160.0 sec
160.0-170.0 sec
170.0-180.0 sec
180.0-190.0 sec
190.0-200.0 sec
0.0-200.0 sec

No FIPS
Transfer
Bandwidth
98.9 MBytes 82.9 Mbits/sec
104 MBytes 87.1 Mbits/sec
92.4 MBytes 77.5 Mbits/sec
92.8 MBytes 77.8 Mbits/sec
96.2 MBytes 80.7 Mbits/sec
92.8 MBytes 77.8 Mbits/sec
92.6 MBytes 77.7 Mbits/sec
98.4 MBytes 82.5 Mbits/sec
92.5 MBytes 77.6 Mbits/sec
92.6 MBytes 77.7 Mbits/sec
98.2 MBytes 82.4 Mbits/sec
92.2 MBytes 77.4 Mbits/sec
93.0 MBytes 78.0 Mbits/sec
96.8 MBytes 81.2 Mbits/sec
93.4 MBytes 78.3 Mbits/sec
92.4 MBytes 77.5 Mbits/sec
99.2 MBytes 83.3 Mbits/sec
92.6 MBytes 77.7 Mbits/sec
92.6 MBytes 77.7 Mbits/sec
99.0 MBytes 83.0 Mbits/sec
Total
Average
1.86 GBytes 79.8 Mbits/sec
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FIPS
Transfer
Bandwidth
92.9 MBytes 77.9 Mbits/sec
79.4 MBytes 66.6 Mbits/sec
80.0 MBytes 67.1 Mbits/sec
84.5 MBytes 70.9 Mbits/sec
78.9 MBytes 66.2 Mbits/sec
80.1 MBytes 67.2 Mbits/sec
87.9 MBytes 73.7 Mbits/sec
79.1 MBytes 66.4 Mbits/sec
79.8 MBytes 66.9 Mbits/sec
113 MBytes 95.0 Mbits/sec
79.9 MBytes 67.0 Mbits/sec
79.6 MBytes 66.8 Mbits/sec
83.2 MBytes 69.8 Mbits/sec
80.4 MBytes 67.4 Mbits/sec
79.8 MBytes 66.9 Mbits/sec
81.8 MBytes 68.6 Mbits/sec
85.6 MBytes 71.8 Mbits/sec
82.0 MBytes 68.8 Mbits/sec
88.6 MBytes 74.3 Mbits/sec
79.2 MBytes 66.5 Mbits/sec
Total
Average
1.64 GBytes 70.3 Mbits/sec

Table 4.9: Mac Client Iperf Results Under Windows Server VPN (PPTP)

Interval
0.0-10.0 sec
10.0-20.0 sec
20.0-30.0 sec
30.0-40.0 sec
40.0-50.0 sec
50.0-60.0 sec
60.0-70.0 sec
70.0-80.0 sec
80.0-90.0 sec
90.0-100.0 sec
100.0-110.0 sec
110.0-120.0 sec
120.0-130.0 sec
130.0-140.0 sec
140.0-150.0 sec
150.0-160.0 sec
160.0-170.0 sec
170.0-180.0 sec
180.0-190.0 sec
190.0-200.0 sec
0.0-200.0 sec

4.1.4

No FIPS
Transfer
Bandwidth
152 MBytes 128 Mbits/sec
134 MBytes 112 Mbits/sec
74.9 MBytes 62.8 Mbits/sec
69.8 MBytes 58.5 Mbits/sec
79.0 MBytes 66.3 Mbits/sec
73.9 MBytes 62.0 Mbits/sec
125 MBytes 105 Mbits/sec
220 MBytes 185 Mbits/sec
218 MBytes 182 Mbits/sec
218 MBytes 183 Mbits/sec
222 MBytes 186 Mbits/sec
219 MBytes 183 Mbits/sec
197 MBytes 165 Mbits/sec
105 MBytes 88.2 Mbits/sec
72.5 MBytes 60.8 Mbits/sec
74.8 MBytes 62.7 Mbits/sec
91.8 MBytes 77.0 Mbits/sec
74.9 MBytes 62.8 Mbits/sec
74.0 MBytes 62.1 Mbits/sec
152 MBytes 128 Mbits/sec
Total
Average
2.59 GBytes 111 Mbits/sec

FIPS
Transfer
Bandwidth
72.5 MBytes 60.8 Mbits/sec
72.0 MBytes 60.4 Mbits/sec
182 MBytes 152 Mbits/sec
218 MBytes 183 Mbits/sec
222 MBytes 186 Mbits/sec
218 MBytes 183 Mbits/sec
84.6 MBytes 71.0 Mbits/sec
72.9 MBytes 61.1 Mbits/sec
76.8 MBytes 64.4 Mbits/sec
85.1 MBytes 71.4 Mbits/sec
192 MBytes 161 Mbits/sec
223 MBytes 187 Mbits/sec
193 MBytes 162 Mbits/sec
199 MBytes 167 Mbits/sec
204 MBytes 171 Mbits/sec
194 MBytes 163 Mbits/sec
80.6 MBytes 67.6 Mbits/sec
81.8 MBytes 68.6 Mbits/sec
85.5 MBytes 71.7 Mbits/sec
77.1 MBytes 64.7 Mbits/sec
Total
Average
2.77 GBytes 119 Mbits/sec

Android Client Results
This section lists the iperf results gathered from the Android platform. See Table 4.10 for

the iperf test communicating to the server agent with no VPN involved. See Table 4.11 for the
iperf tests on the Palo Alto VMs. See Table 4.12 for the iperf tests conducted on OpenVPN. See
Table 4.13 for the iperf tests results done through the Windows PPTP server.
An important reminder regarding the analysis of Palo Alto through Android is that for the
Android to connect to its VPN, the firewall requires licensing for the app to successfully connect.
The normal mode firewall was the only Palo Alto VM to gain a license key to permit the
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connection, meaning results for the FIPS-CC mode firewall couldn’t be attained during the
testing period. However, a request for a license key was sent out to a Palo Alto Networks
associate, but time constraints forced FIPS-CC mode results to be cut for this scenario.

Table 4.10: Android Client Iperf Results with No VPN
Interval
0.0-10.0 sec
10.0-20.0 sec
20.0-30.0 sec
30.0-40.0 sec
40.0-50.0 sec
50.0-60.0 sec
60.0-70.0 sec
70.0-80.0 sec
80.0-90.0 sec
90.0-100.0 sec
100.0-110.0 sec
110.0-120.0 sec
120.0-130.0 sec
130.0-140.0 sec
140.0-150.0 sec
150.0-160.0 sec
160.0-170.0 sec
170.0-180.0 sec
180.0-190.0 sec
190.0-200.0 sec
0.0-200.0 sec

Transfer
73.6 MBytes
78.5 MBytes
80.4 MBytes
79.0 MBytes
76.0 MBytes
71.9 MBytes
71.1 MBytes
79.2 MBytes
78.1 MBytes
76.4 MBytes
77.5 MBytes
77.5 MBytes
67.6 MBytes
74.8 MBytes
80.9 MBytes
77.0 MBytes
78.0 MBytes
76.5 MBytes
69.8 MBytes
71.5 MBytes
Total
1.48 GBytes

56

Bandwidth
61.8 Mbits/sec
65.9 Mbits/sec
67.4 Mbits/sec
66.3 Mbits/sec
63.8 Mbits/sec
60.3 Mbits/sec
59.7 Mbits/sec
66.5 Mbits/sec
65.5 Mbits/sec
64.1 Mbits/sec
65.0 Mbits/sec
65.0 Mbits/sec
56.7 Mbits/sec
62.7 Mbits/sec
67.8 Mbits/sec
64.6 Mbits/sec
65.4 Mbits/sec
64.2 Mbits/sec
58.5 Mbits/sec
60.0 Mbits/sec
Average
63.6 Mbits/sec

Table 4.11: Android Client Iperf Results Using Palo Alto VPN

Interval
0.0-10.0 sec
10.0-20.0 sec
20.0-30.0 sec
30.0-40.0 sec
40.0-50.0 sec
50.0-60.0 sec
60.0-70.0 sec
70.0-80.0 sec
80.0-90.0 sec
90.0-100.0 sec
100.0-110.0 sec
110.0-120.0 sec
120.0-130.0 sec
130.0-140.0 sec
140.0-150.0 sec
150.0-160.0 sec
160.0-170.0 sec
170.0-180.0 sec
180.0-190.0 sec
190.0-200.0 sec
0.0-200.0 sec

No FIPS
Transfer
Bandwidth
71.5 MBytes 60.0 Mbits/sec
63.8 MBytes 53.5 Mbits/sec
59.4 MBytes 49.8 Mbits/sec
65.5 MBytes 54.9 Mbits/sec
61.5 MBytes 51.6 Mbits/sec
67.1 MBytes 56.3 Mbits/sec
66.0 MBytes 55.4 Mbits/sec
60.1 MBytes 50.4 Mbits/sec
59.4 MBytes 49.8 Mbits/sec
62.5 MBytes 52.4 Mbits/sec
63.9 MBytes 53.6 Mbits/sec
66.4 MBytes 55.7 Mbits/sec
58.6 MBytes 49.2 Mbits/sec
63.8 MBytes 53.5 Mbits/sec
66.1 MBytes 55.5 Mbits/sec
63.5 MBytes 53.3 Mbits/sec
66.6 MBytes 55.9 Mbits/sec
63.8 MBytes 53.5 Mbits/sec
63.0 MBytes 52.8 Mbits/sec
63.6 MBytes 53.4 Mbits/sec
Total
Average
1.25 GBytes 53.5 Mbits/sec
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Table 4.12: Android Client Iperf Results Using OpenVPN

Interval
0.0-10.0 sec
10.0-20.0 sec
20.0-30.0 sec
30.0-40.0 sec
40.0-50.0 sec
50.0-60.0 sec
60.0-70.0 sec
70.0-80.0 sec
80.0-90.0 sec
90.0-100.0 sec
100.0-110.0 sec
110.0-120.0 sec
120.0-130.0 sec
130.0-140.0 sec
140.0-150.0 sec
150.0-160.0 sec
160.0-170.0 sec
170.0-180.0 sec
180.0-190.0 sec
190.0-200.0 sec
0.0-200.0 sec

No FIPS
Transfer
Bandwidth
20.5 MBytes 18.3 Mbits/sec
17.0 MBytes 14.9 Mbits/sec
17.4 MBytes 15.2 Mbits/sec
21.2 MBytes 18.8 Mbits/sec
19.2 MBytes 17.3 Mbits/sec
25.5 MBytes 21.8 Mbits/sec
22.7 MBytes 19.2 Mbits/sec
20.2 MBytes 18.4 Mbits/sec
23.6 MBytes 19.9 Mbits/sec
20.1 MBytes 18.0 Mbits/sec
24.0 MBytes 20.1 Mbits/sec
25.5 MBytes 21.8 Mbits/sec
23.5 MBytes 19.8 Mbits/sec
22.6 MBytes 19.1 Mbits/sec
21.5 MBytes 18.9 Mbits/sec
21.2 MBytes 18.7 Mbits/sec
21.3 MBytes 18.8 Mbits/sec
24.5 MBytes 20.4 Mbits/sec
30.8 MBytes 25.5 Mbits/sec
28.1 MBytes 23.6 Mbits/sec
Total
Average
450 MBytes 19.4 Mbits/sec
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FIPS
Transfer
Bandwidth
11.5 MBytes 9.65 Mbits/sec
8.75 MBytes 7.34 Mbits/sec
7.75 MBytes 6.50 Mbits/sec
7.25 MBytes 6.08 Mbits/sec
14.8 MBytes 12.4 Mbits/sec
17.6 MBytes 14.8 Mbits/sec
20.5 MBytes 17.2 Mbits/sec
23.9 MBytes 20.0 Mbits/sec
22.8 MBytes 19.1 Mbits/sec
24.1 MBytes 20.2 Mbits/sec
18.1 MBytes 15.2 Mbits/sec
24.4 MBytes 20.4 Mbits/sec
24.5 MBytes 20.6 Mbits/sec
23.6 MBytes 19.8 Mbits/sec
23.5 MBytes 19.7 Mbits/sec
23.2 MBytes 19.5 Mbits/sec
24.2 MBytes 20.3 Mbits/sec
19.5 MBytes 16.4 Mbits/sec
19.4 MBytes 16.3 Mbits/sec
25.0 MBytes 21.0 Mbits/sec
Total
Average
384 MBytes 16.1 Mbits/sec

Table 4.13: Android Client Iperf Results Using Windows Server VPN (PPTP)

Interval
0.0-10.0 sec
10.0-20.0 sec
20.0-30.0 sec
30.0-40.0 sec
40.0-50.0 sec
50.0-60.0 sec
60.0-70.0 sec
70.0-80.0 sec
80.0-90.0 sec
90.0-100.0 sec
100.0-110.0 sec
110.0-120.0 sec
120.0-130.0 sec
130.0-140.0 sec
140.0-150.0 sec
150.0-160.0 sec
160.0-170.0 sec
170.0-180.0 sec
180.0-190.0 sec
190.0-200.0 sec
0.0-200.0 sec

No FIPS
Transfer
Bandwidth
33.9 MBytes 28.4 Mbits/sec
31.8 MBytes 26.6 Mbits/sec
32.1 MBytes 26.9 Mbits/sec
28.4 MBytes 23.8 Mbits/sec
15.8 MBytes 13.2 Mbits/sec
27.5 MBytes 23.1 Mbits/sec
34.0 MBytes 28.5 Mbits/sec
22.6 MBytes 19.0 Mbits/sec
29.5 MBytes 24.7 Mbits/sec
21.6 MBytes 18.1 Mbits/sec
19.5 MBytes 16.4 Mbits/sec
17.8 MBytes 14.9 Mbits/sec
28.1 MBytes 23.6 Mbits/sec
18.2 MBytes 15.3 Mbits/sec
32.5 MBytes 27.3 Mbits/sec
21.4 MBytes 17.9 Mbits/sec
33.6 MBytes 28.2 Mbits/sec
30.2 MBytes 25.4 Mbits/sec
34.2 MBytes 28.7 Mbits/sec
25.1 MBytes 21.1 Mbits/sec
Total
Average
538 MBytes 22.6 Mbits/sec

FIPS
Transfer
Bandwidth
41.5 MBytes 34.8 Mbits/sec
26.1 MBytes 21.9 Mbits/sec
29.9 MBytes 25.1 Mbits/sec
25.2 MBytes 21.2 Mbits/sec
21.8 MBytes 18.2 Mbits/sec
35.9 MBytes 30.1 Mbits/sec
31.0 MBytes 26.0 Mbits/sec
41.4 MBytes 34.7 Mbits/sec
23.9 MBytes 20.0 Mbits/sec
25.9 MBytes 21.7 Mbits/sec
18.8 MBytes 15.7 Mbits/sec
41.5 MBytes 34.8 Mbits/sec
27.9 MBytes 23.4 Mbits/sec
37.4 MBytes 31.4 Mbits/sec
24.8 MBytes 20.8 Mbits/sec
25.6 MBytes 21.5 Mbits/sec
27.1 MBytes 22.8 Mbits/sec
22.6 MBytes 19.0 Mbits/sec
49.8 MBytes 41.7 Mbits/sec
47.5 MBytes 39.8 Mbits/sec
Total
Average
626 MBytes 26.1 Mbits/sec

Framework Analysis
The validity of FAVE relied on the network connectivity and traffic between iperf client
and server through VPN tunneling. This section covers the analysis and understanding of how
the data resulted in the way it did, particularly the technological issues and limitations during the
research period resulting in questionable outputs at first glance. The objectives include
evaluating the framework’s capability of providing distinction of different encryption settings
implemented upon VPNs and how it affections different client platforms reaching out to the
same desktop endpoint.
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4.2.1

Limitations
The main limitation during the research involved acquiring sufficient resources to build

the framework with. Given that FAVE was built from scratch, it took a good amount of time to
plan out the network topology and the machines needed to support the topology. The computer
lab the framework development took place in spared the needed machines for the framework,
which included a wireless router and a couple of Dell hard drives to install VMware ESXi and
Windows Server 2016. The ova and iso files for the VPN VMs were also provided and promptly
installed into the ESXi environment with limited space. Given equal partitioning of memory and
space for each VM, the ESXi environment was able to hold up to five VMs.
The limited space on the ESXi also signified that only a few snapshots in total could be
taken when a need arose to roll back a VM. If there were more snapshots saved that the ESXi
could allocate, any suspended VM would be unable to power on, outputting “Module
‘MonitorLoop” power on failed” on the interface. Only a couple of snapshots should be taken as
failsafe using sound judgment if experimenting with a VPN configuration with a high error risk.
Only when the VPN configuration becomes satisfactory should the lingering snapshots be
deleted to free up additional space for the ESXi environment.
Concerning further hardware limitations, packet monitoring and capturing was initially
performed through the ASUS Wireless Router using tcpdump. The methodology switched over
to monitoring through the ProLiant DL165 G6 Basic SATA because it was discovered that the
router was dropping about a quarter of the expected data packet total during the fixed transfer
iperf tests. The Basic SATA boasted a more robust frame in keeping the data flowing with a zero
percent drop rate.
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Another major limitation was the liberal usage of Palo Alto software to certain degrees.
The ova file to create a Palo Alto firewall was provided by the computer lab due to the
sponsorship with Palo Alto Networks. However, obtaining a license key to use the firewall’s full
features, including the ability for the GlobalProtect app for Android to connect to it, required a
more formal process. One license key was readily available from the research lab to use for the
first Palo Alto firewall set in normal mode. A request was made for another license key to use for
the second firewall set in FIPS-CC mode to fully test the Android’s interoperability over their
settings and further validate the framework by comparing averaged bandwidth rates, but due to
time constraints, this factor had to be cut from the analysis.

4.2.2

VPN Traffic Explanation
As the primary objective of the framework, VPN tuning is the process of boosting the

performance of a VPN after an evaluation of its architecture and hardware. Following the series
of iperf tests on each client device running through different VPN settings, a distinct trend can be
found shared across all the platforms during the twenty consecutive intervals.
The tests identified the majority average of bandwidth of VPNs set to FIPS mode to be
lower than the bandwidth of VPNs using their default security configurations, including the
bandwidth for client devices regularly connecting to the iperf server under no VPN tunnel.
However, there are certain exceptions wherein the FIPS-enabled settings of a VPN resulted in a
higher averaged bandwidth than the vendor-default settings. How significantly the bandwidth
rate differs between the two varies depending on what VPN is involved and which client device
attempted the connection. See Figures 4-1 and 4-2 for graphs depicting the differences via
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standard error bars; the gap in difference between a VPN not using FIPS and using FIPS can be
disregarded if the error bar endpoints are within each other’s range.
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Figure 4-1: Fixed Transfer Results Graph with Standard Error Bars
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Figure 4-2: Collected Iperf Results Graph with Standard Error Bars
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A glaring example of bandwidth rates distinctively separate on the same VPN setting is
the Palo Alto setting as seen on both Windows and Mac clients. An example outcome from
analyzing the results of Figure 4-2 can be an administrator leaning away from using Palo Alto if
FIPS 140-2 was the designated security standards for the network, preferring to use OpenVPN
instead because of its considerably balanced rate between network speed and secure connection,
at least at first glance. There is still the fact that OpenVPN has incurred the highest encryption
overhead among the others in the fixed byte transfer tests. A more thorough explanation is
required on why the averaged bandwidths are the way they are, which would involve deeper
investigation into the security and encryption processes occurring during client-server
communication.
To ensure confidence regarding the bandwidth differences between FIPS and no-FIPS, ttests have been taken for each client and VPN. The t-tests are held to the recognized significance
level of 0.05. They were calculated by Microsoft Excel, using the arrays of collected FIPS and
non-FIPS iperf results, one-tailed distribution, and depending on the variance for each array,
equal or unequal types. Table 4.14 lists the p-values that meet significance level standards.

Table 4.14: T-Test Significant P-values
VPN & Client

T-Test P-value

Palo Alto, Windows

3.63037E-31

OpenVPN, Windows

1.64965E-07

PPTP, Windows

0.006129484

Palo Alto, Mac

9.93778E-39

OpenVPN, Mac

1.74438E-06

OpenVPN, Android

0.006316539

PPTP, Android

0.040322866
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The missing factors, PPTP, Mac and Palo Alto, Android, are excluded due to the latter’s
limitations and the former having a p-value higher than the significance level. Mac’s bandwidth
behavior through the PPTP connection shows no difference regardless of VPN settings and is
explained further down this section. As for the listed p-values, the statistics reaffirm the degrees
of variance between FIPS and no-FIPS for the selected VPN and client factors. The most
significant p-values involve Palo Alto on both featured clients followed by OpenVPN for
Windows and Mac, further contributing to the bandwidth gaps between these two VPNs.
During the initial setup of the FIPS Object Module for OpenVPN, it was found that for
FIPS to cooperate with OpenSSL, the product had to be of certain versions. The OpenSSL
version used is 1.0.2o. In short, the previous OpenSSL version installed in the Ubuntu Server had
to be uninstalled while a compatible version had to be found and installed in its place. This,
among a few basic terminal lines of unpackaging and running make files to integrate the FIPS
Object Module and compatible OpenSSL version together took nearly two months to complete.
This is because they are separate applications that aren’t provided in a Linux machine by default,
although in some cases a version of OpenSSL comes preinstalled. Compared to the way a Palo
Alto firewall switches into FIPS-CC mode within several minutes of instruction and waiting, as
written in the Methodology chapter, this is a troubling issue as there is the expectation that the
FIPS-CC firewall is performing multiple encryption policies and procedures, but even then, there
isn’t a one-hundred percent guarantee that the transferred data is fully protected from outside
exploitation.
In addition to the presented findings, these results would otherwise confirm the idea of
consistent encryption overhead effecting the bandwidth rate by significantly slowing its
performance, meaning that FIPS mode enforces only strong and approved encryption algorithms
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to protect the network as processed by previous network trials regarding the effects of encryption
(Anitha Rani, Ram Kumar, & Prem Kumar, 2016). The average bandwidth of each client sans
VPN usage is significantly high, attributing to the lack of encryption overhead, though there is
some deviance between results to take note of between the sequential iperf tests. Standard
deviations were taken for each client and setting to differentiate the results. See Table 4.15 for
the calculated standard deviation for this setting.

Table 4.15: Standard Deviations for Clients' Iperf Results Using No VPN
Operating System

Standard Deviation σ

Windows

10.924628140124

Mac

7.4973328590906

Android

3.0181782584864

The Palo Alto bandwidth while in FIPS-CC mode is significantly lower in comparison to
its normal counterpart upon inspection of Tables 4.3 and 4.7 throughout all clients that connected
to Palo Alto with and without FIPS upon comparing their resulting averages. However, in the
case of the Android client, there is no available comparison between FIPS and no FIPS settings
as it was previously mentioned that the license key needed to activate the full features of the Palo
Alto firewall running FIPS-CC mode was requested for, but it was not issued within the time
frame. Given that this VPN participant is a sophisticated specialized software built by an
enterprise for this purpose, the iperf tests validate its efficiency with general consistency between
intervals, at least when under normal mode. See Table 4.16 for the standard deviations between
Palo Alto’s iperf bandwidth results.
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Table 4.16: Standard Deviations of Palo Alto Iperf Results
Setting

Standard Deviation σ

Windows, No FIPS

4.0570925550202

Windows, FIPS

184.79964826806

Mac, No FIPS

1.9104973174543

Mac, FIPS

141.26305249427

Android, No FIPS

2.5602490113268

Android, FIPS

N/A

It would be safe to determine from the standard deviations of the collective iperf results
under FIPS-CC mode for each available client device, as well as the fixed transfer byte test
performed in this setting, that heavy encryption procedures and TCP handshakes are taking place
within the VPN tunnel during live communication.
The iperf results for OpenVPN appear to also follow the trend of the bandwidth average
being noticeably greater using its default settings versus the average collected with the FIPS
module enabled. However, unlike Palo Alto, there isn’t a significant gap between the two
settings, only separable by less than ten megabytes compared to markedly crossing over from
megabytes to kilobytes. This would suggest that there isn’t a huge difference between averaged
bandwidth rates, but the t-tests listed in Table 4.14 for clients connecting under OpenVPN do
suggest significant differences between the two settings on each client. Compared to the Palo
Alto and PPTP settings, the OpenVPN t-test p-values are in the middle range with PPTP p-values
reaching the closest to default significance level 0.05. Nonetheless, the individual variances for
OpenVPN settings running for each client are low. See Table 4.17 for the standard deviations of
OpenVPN’s iperf results.
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Table 4.17: Standard Deviations of OpenVPN Iperf Results
Setting

Standard Deviation σ

Windows, No FIPS

4.7156627317907

Windows, FIPS

1.5847712768725

Mac, No FIPS

2.7795503233437

Mac, FIPS

6.4733221764408

Android, No FIPS

2.4116125310671

Android, FIPS

4.9398352958373

OpenVPN’s low bandwidth is attributed to the overhead of encrypting small data packets
instead of one large packet at a time (Hoekstra & Musulin, 2011). On a related note, while
performing the fixed transfer test on Windows under both OpenVPN settings, the readout during
packet capture revealed that not all one-hundred megabytes were filtered despite no dropped
packets. The phenomenon was discovered to be the Windows client innately compressing the
data packet through some internal system process. Data compression reduces frame sizes being
transmitted over network links. The exact process or feature in Windows that caused the
compression, inadvertently skewing the packet conversation analysis, is unknown, but
discovering this phenomenon alone using the FAVE framework is within scope, fulfilling its
purpose.
It appears that it is this same property that has affected the iperf continuous interval and
fixed transfer results for the Windows Server VPN. Aaron Margosis of Microsoft discussed
about the company’s revoking of their previous recommendation of enabling FIPS mode for all
versions of Windows client and Windows Server. The article reminds that enabling FIPS mode
would result in disabling non-validated cryptographic classes, suggesting that in the case of
Windows it is doing more harm than good. Since the trend of lower bandwidth from the testing
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leans toward the fact that secure encryption overhead is incurring, there indicates the possibility
that the FIPS policy may be disabling some of the system’s more commonly used algorithms
because they haven’t been validated.
The resulting averages from the Windows Server VPN overall appear to be the inverse of
the recurring trend with the FIPS-enabled averages having higher bandwidth than the averages
obtained with the FIPS option disabled. The iperf results appear to be particularly spread out,
especially for the Mac client. See Table 4.18 for the standard deviations of the Windows Server
VPN iperf results.

Table 4.18: Standard Deviations of Windows Server PPTP Iperf Results
Setting

Standard Deviation σ

Windows, No FIPS

7.2209608086459

Windows, FIPS

6.7732174776837

Mac, No FIPS

50.379955339401

Mac, FIPS

53.405470459495

Android, No FIPS

5.022688523092

Android, FIPS

7.3748966094448

Discussions within the Apple community shared similar issues regarding the Mac
platform’s peculiar behavior and cooperability with a Windows VPN, particularly the later
versions gaining slow throughput upon connecting with a PPTP VPN. The macOS Sierra
Version 10.12.3 and later versions beyond 10.12 has Apple drop the option to establish a PPTP
link because of the protocol’s insecurity, requiring third party VPN software to create
connectivity with a PPTP VPN. However, even then, the stability of third party software
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attempting to reintroduce a dropped feature is expected cause some internal conflict with the
system processes because of conflicting objectives.
Nonetheless, the utilization of FAVE revealed the issue and with additional analysis,
appropriate action would be taken in considering the VPN style and recommended client devices
to use for optimal performances and secure communication.

4.2.3

FIPS Application
The decision to use FIPS 140-2 as a standard to compare against default security settings

of different VPN structures proved to be satisfactory. FIPS 140-2 was initially selected due to it
being the currently published standard of cryptographic protection to test against, helped by the
fact that the encryption algorithms it forces systems to use are approved by the federal
government for computer security.
Its actual application on real world devices, however, is dependent on the user’s needs
and desires. While the application of FIPS has proven to slow down bandwidth for the most part
or is considered redundant in the Windows case, it is still considered secure with its set of
encryption algorithms.

4.2.4

Framework Validation
The FAVE framework has accomplished its purpose in providing a unique method of

tuning VPN security settings through the evaluation of iperf performance test results. By reading
the trends between continuous intervals and calculating the average and standard deviation of the
results, explanations regarding anomalies within the bandwidth behavior can determine the true
cause.
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Overall, it is integral for an organization or entity to first understand the infrastructure of
the kind of VPN it wants to deploy prior to a formal setup. Mapping out the VPN topology, such
as determining how much bandwidth the VPN can afford for connections before all users would
experience bottleneck, would save a lot of time and resources early during the trial run. For
example, solutions for preserving bandwidth if the organization does not wish to pay for
additional bandwidth can include cutting down the number of clients allowed to connect to the
VPN. In any case, it takes manual effort to monitor VPN performance and make the appropriate
patches to maintain speed and security.
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5

CONCLUSION & FUTURE WORK

The purpose of this research was to develop a VPN tuning framework from scratch with
the default settings of each involved VPN infrastructure compared to an enforced standard of
encryption algorithms published by the US federal government. The main objective to validate
the framework for future continuation involves being able to determine sources of bandwidth
issue from comparing a VPN’s normal settings with FIPS-enforced rules. The research question
tied in to the objective was to determine the differences between a VPN using FIPS-enforced
settings compared to its default security. This chapter summarizes the findings and opens future
possibilities using this research as the basis.
FAVE is the developed VPN tuning framework, depicting the roles of setup and roles of
tested VPNs during the client-server communication. It would be safe to say that the framework
is repeatable, whether under the same circumstances as performed in this research or for a whole
new VPN-testing scenario altogether. It detected significant differences between different VPN
settings as discussed previously in the Framework Analysis section of the last chapter. Of course,
given the limited resources, frequent technological issues, and time constraints faced in this
undertaking, the framework is far from perfect, but it does allow plenty of room for
improvement.
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Future Research
The following section provides additional insights and discarded ideas that can be
considered for future research:
•

Inclusion of Linux and additional platforms as clients, including the cut Android running
through Palo Alto FIPS-CC mode.

•

5.1.1

Automated performance testing through scripts.

Linux Involvement
After careful contemplation over the framework development, Linux was not used as a

client platform despite using OpenVPN on an Ubuntu Server. Include Linux in all performance
tests by installing the operating system into a desktop machine instead of having it as a VM.
Linux was initially going to be used alongside Windows, Mac, and Android, but for the
framework to apply, Linux needed to connect to all VPNs with no issue. One problem found was
configuring an Ubuntu Linux VM to conform to the Palo Alto Network’s GlobalProtect through
the strongSwan client, which led to narrowing the scope of this research by cutting most of
Linux’s planned involvement out of the framework due to its unforeseen difficulty and lack of
time.
The technical issues behind GlobalProtect had extended to the mobile app to a degree
during testing. Because the framework was developed by machines and software provided by the
BYU CSRL, there were limited features to test with. Fortunately, much progress was capable of
being carried out without a full Palo Alto subscription, but this is a note for a future that to make
full use of an enterprise VPN software, it will require a planned budget and a sure dedication to
study its performance.
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The developed framework has opened the possibility to involve more platforms and
operating systems for future VPN testing, such as iOS in addition to Linux and possibly its
different distros. Ubuntu would be ideal to test given its simplicity, but there’s also the
possibility of testing the likes of Debian, Fedora, or even CentOS if one researcher feels daring
enough.

5.1.2

Automated Tests
The VPN performance tests were executed manually through the iperf v2 tool, which was

required to be installed in all actively participating devices. Could have there been a more
efficient method in collecting network performance data through a single executable command?
This question poses the possibility for researchers to write up a script under any coding language,
such as C, Ruby, Node JS, or Python, and have the script run through the motions of collecting
the data without the hassle of going back and forth between devices.
In addition to writing scripts that can perform automated network performance analyses,
the challenge lies in making the script compatible with a variety of tools like iperf. The
automated scripts themselves would have to be open-sourced as to be interoperable with any tool
and platform available. This consideration was formulated in mind after considering certain tools
are not even backwards compatible, iperf being the forefront example. Iperf was selected on the
basis that it was the only viable network testing tool that can cooperate with Windows, Mac,
Android, and Linux all at once. Other open-sourced network tools like netpipe and netperf are
compatible with Linux and most UNIX-based distributions, but I haven’t found any
documentation of these tools able to operate in other platforms like Windows without requiring
intensive time-consuming configuration.
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Observations
The framework that was developed to tune VPNs according to network performance on
devices is enough to prove the need to accommodate to popular opinion. It should be brought to
attention that the major issue discovered while developing FAVE was the manner of configuring
FIPS to each participating VPN. For the Palo Alto firewall and Windows Server, setting up FIPS
took a duration of ten minutes or less due to their systems having a capacity to enable FIPS
within a few steps. OpenVPN, however, required more attention in configuring its settings to
cooperate with the FIPS Object Module.
As written in the Methodology chapter and explained in the Framework Analysis section,
the ability to configure FIPS instead of simply switching it off or on grants complete control over
the system. The duration of finding and manually installing the FIPS Object Module and
compatible OpenSSL version extended to nearly two months. Given that OpenVPN and the
involved extensions are open-sourced, there is the assumption that freedom of control was what
allowed the average bandwidth of OpenVPN with FIPS to reach up to the non-FIPS results better
than Palo Alto, providing a suggestion for deeper investigation behind the latter’s security.
To further validate the efficiency of the VPN-tuning framework with the potential to
expand and improve upon it, it would be helpful to have users sufficiently knowledgeable in the
information technology field, such as the students and faculty involved with the BYU
Information Technology program and the Cyber Security Research Lab, to test and scrutinize the
tuning framework for themselves by either with the tools and systems used here or by similar
methods. The additional validation will provide necessary insight that haven’t been covered from
the initial testing performed from this research, opening new paths and possibility on VPN
performance tuning for the future to come.
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APPENDIX A.

OPENVPN SERVER CONFIGURED FILES

A.1 ~/openvpn-ca/vars
# easy-rsa parameter settings
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#

NOTE: If you installed from an RPM,
don't edit this file in place in
/usr/share/openvpn/easy-rsa -instead, you should copy the whole
easy-rsa directory to another location
(such as /etc/openvpn) so that your
edits will not be wiped out by a future
OpenVPN package upgrade.

# This variable should point to
# the top level of the easy-rsa
# tree.
export EASY_RSA="`pwd`"
#
# This variable should point to
# the requested executables
#
export OPENSSL="openssl"
export PKCS11TOOL="pkcs11-tool"
export GREP="grep"
# This variable should point to
# the openssl.cnf file included
# with easy-rsa.
export KEY_CONFIG=`$EASY_RSA/whichopensslcnf $EASY_RSA`
#
#
#
#
#
#
#

Edit this variable to point to
your soon-to-be-created key
directory.
WARNING: clean-all will do
a rm -rf on this directory
so make sure you define
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# it correctly!
export KEY_DIR="$EASY_RSA/keys"
# Issue rm -rf warning
echo NOTE: If you run ./clean-all, I will be doing a rm -rf on
$KEY_DIR
# PKCS11 fixes
export PKCS11_MODULE_PATH="dummy"
export PKCS11_PIN="dummy"
# Increase this to 2048 if you
# are paranoid. This will slow
# down TLS negotiation performance
# as well as the one-time DH parms
# generation process.
export KEY_SIZE=2048
# In how many days should the root CA key expire?
export CA_EXPIRE=3650
# In how many days should certificates expire?
export KEY_EXPIRE=3650
# These are the default values for fields
# which will be placed in the certificate.
# Don't leave any of these fields blank.
export KEY_COUNTRY="US"
export KEY_PROVINCE="UT"
export KEY_CITY="Provo"
export KEY_ORG="BrighamYoungUniversity"
export KEY_EMAIL="fperez@byu.edu"
export KEY_OU="CSRL"
# X509 Subject Field
export KEY_NAME="server"
# PKCS11 Smart Card
# export PKCS11_MODULE_PATH="/usr/lib/changeme.so"
# export PKCS11_PIN=1234
# If you'd like to sign all keys with the same Common Name, uncomment
the KEY_CN export below
# You will also need to make sure your OpenVPN server config has the
duplicate-cn option set
# export KEY_CN="CommonName"

A.2 /etc/openvpn/server.conf
#################################################
# Sample OpenVPN 2.0 config file for
#
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# multi-client server.
#
#
#
# This file is for the server side
#
# of a many-clients <-> one-server
#
# OpenVPN configuration.
#
#
#
# OpenVPN also supports
#
# single-machine <-> single-machine
#
# configurations (See the Examples page
#
# on the web site for more info).
#
#
#
# This config should work on Windows
#
# or Linux/BSD systems. Remember on
#
# Windows to quote pathnames and use
#
# double backslashes, e.g.:
#
# "C:\\Program Files\\OpenVPN\\config\\foo.key" #
#
#
# Comments are preceded with '#' or ';'
#
#################################################
# Which local IP address should OpenVPN
# listen on? (optional)
;local a.b.c.d
# Which TCP/UDP port should OpenVPN listen on?
# If you want to run multiple OpenVPN instances
# on the same machine, use a different port
# number for each one. You will need to
# open up this port on your firewall.
port 1194
# TCP or UDP server?
;proto tcp
proto udp
# "dev tun" will create a routed IP tunnel,
# "dev tap" will create an ethernet tunnel.
# Use "dev tap0" if you are ethernet bridging
# and have precreated a tap0 virtual interface
# and bridged it with your ethernet interface.
# If you want to control access policies
# over the VPN, you must create firewall
# rules for the the TUN/TAP interface.
# On non-Windows systems, you can give
# an explicit unit number, such as tun0.
# On Windows, use "dev-node" for this.
# On most systems, the VPN will not function
# unless you partially or fully disable
# the firewall for the TUN/TAP interface.
dev tap0
;dev tun
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# Windows needs the TAP-Win32 adapter name
# from the Network Connections panel if you
# have more than one. On XP SP2 or higher,
# you may need to selectively disable the
# Windows firewall for the TAP adapter.
# Non-Windows systems usually don't need this.
;dev-node MyTap
# SSL/TLS root certificate (ca), certificate
# (cert), and private key (key). Each client
# and the server must have their own cert and
# key file. The server and all clients will
# use the same ca file.
#
# See the "easy-rsa" directory for a series
# of scripts for generating RSA certificates
# and private keys. Remember to use
# a unique Common Name for the server
# and each of the client certificates.
#
# Any X509 key management system can be used.
# OpenVPN can also use a PKCS #12 formatted key file
# (see "pkcs12" directive in man page).
ca ca.crt
cert server.crt
key server.key # This file should be kept secret
# Diffie hellman parameters.
# Generate your own with:
#
openssl dhparam -out dh2048.pem 2048
dh dh2048.pem
# Network topology
# Should be subnet (addressing via IP)
# unless Windows clients v2.0.9 and lower have to
# be supported (then net30, i.e. a /30 per client)
# Defaults to net30 (not recommended)
;topology subnet
# Configure server mode and supply a VPN subnet
# for OpenVPN to draw client addresses from.
# The server will take 10.8.0.1 for itself,
# the rest will be made available to clients.
# Each client will be able to reach the server
# on 10.8.0.1. Comment this line out if you are
# ethernet bridging. See the man page for more info.
;server 192.168.43.0 255.255.255.0
#
#
#
#

Maintain a record of client <-> virtual IP address
associations in this file. If OpenVPN goes down or
is restarted, reconnecting clients can be assigned
the same virtual IP address from the pool that was
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# previously assigned.
ifconfig-pool-persist ipp.txt
# Configure server mode for ethernet bridging.
# You must first use your OS's bridging capability
# to bridge the TAP interface with the ethernet
# NIC interface. Then you must manually set the
# IP/netmask on the bridge interface, here we
# assume 10.8.0.4/255.255.255.0. Finally we
# must set aside an IP range in this subnet
# (start=10.8.0.50 end=10.8.0.100) to allocate
# to connecting clients. Leave this line commented
# out unless you are ethernet bridging.
server-bridge 192.168.43.1 255.255.255.0 192.168.43.50 192.168.43.100
# Configure server mode for ethernet bridging
# using a DHCP-proxy, where clients talk
# to the OpenVPN server-side DHCP server
# to receive their IP address allocation
# and DNS server addresses. You must first use
# your OS's bridging capability to bridge the TAP
# interface with the ethernet NIC interface.
# Note: this mode only works on clients (such as
# Windows), where the client-side TAP adapter is
# bound to a DHCP client.
server-bridge
# Push routes to the client to allow it
# to reach other private subnets behind
# the server. Remember that these
# private subnets will also need
# to know to route the OpenVPN client
# address pool (10.8.0.0/255.255.255.0)
# back to the OpenVPN server.
;push "route 192.168.10.0 255.255.255.0"
;push "route 192.168.20.0 255.255.255.0"
#
#
#
#
#

To assign specific IP addresses to specific
clients or if a connecting client has a private
subnet behind it that should also have VPN access,
use the subdirectory "ccd" for client-specific
configuration files (see man page for more info).

# EXAMPLE: Suppose the client
# having the certificate common name "Thelonious"
# also has a small subnet behind his connecting
# machine, such as 192.168.40.128/255.255.255.248.
# First, uncomment out these lines:
;client-config-dir ccd
;route 192.168.40.128 255.255.255.248
# Then create a file ccd/Thelonious with this line:
#
iroute 192.168.40.128 255.255.255.248
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#
#
#
#

This will allow Thelonious' private subnet to
access the VPN. This example will only work
if you are routing, not bridging, i.e. you are
using "dev tun" and "server" directives.

# EXAMPLE: Suppose you want to give
# Thelonious a fixed VPN IP address of 10.9.0.1.
# First uncomment out these lines:
;client-config-dir ccd
;route 10.9.0.0 255.255.255.252
# Then add this line to ccd/Thelonious:
#
ifconfig-push 10.9.0.1 10.9.0.2
# Suppose that you want to enable different
# firewall access policies for different groups
# of clients. There are two methods:
# (1) Run multiple OpenVPN daemons, one for each
#
group, and firewall the TUN/TAP interface
#
for each group/daemon appropriately.
# (2) (Advanced) Create a script to dynamically
#
modify the firewall in response to access
#
from different clients. See man
#
page for more info on learn-address script.
;learn-address ./script
# If enabled, this directive will configure
# all clients to redirect their default
# network gateway through the VPN, causing
# all IP traffic such as web browsing and
# and DNS lookups to go through the VPN
# (The OpenVPN server machine may need to NAT
# or bridge the TUN/TAP interface to the internet
# in order for this to work properly).
push "redirect-gateway def1 bypass-dhcp"
# Certain Windows-specific network settings
# can be pushed to clients, such as DNS
# or WINS server addresses. CAVEAT:
# http://openvpn.net/faq.html#dhcpcaveats
# The addresses below refer to the public
# DNS servers provided by opendns.com.
push "dhcp-option DNS 208.67.222.222"
push "dhcp-option DNS 208.67.220.220"
# Uncomment this directive to allow different
# clients to be able to "see" each other.
# By default, clients will only see the server.
# To force clients to only see the server, you
# will also need to appropriately firewall the
# server's TUN/TAP interface.
;client-to-client
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# Uncomment this directive if multiple clients
# might connect with the same certificate/key
# files or common names. This is recommended
# only for testing purposes. For production use,
# each client should have its own certificate/key
# pair.
#
# IF YOU HAVE NOT GENERATED INDIVIDUAL
# CERTIFICATE/KEY PAIRS FOR EACH CLIENT,
# EACH HAVING ITS OWN UNIQUE "COMMON NAME",
# UNCOMMENT THIS LINE OUT.
;duplicate-cn
# The keepalive directive causes ping-like
# messages to be sent back and forth over
# the link so that each side knows when
# the other side has gone down.
# Ping every 10 seconds, assume that remote
# peer is down if no ping received during
# a 120 second time period.
keepalive 10 120
# For extra security beyond that provided
# by SSL/TLS, create an "HMAC firewall"
# to help block DoS attacks and UDP port flooding.
#
# Generate with:
#
openvpn --genkey --secret ta.key
#
# The server and each client must have
# a copy of this key.
# The second parameter should be '0'
# on the server and '1' on the clients.
tls-auth ta.key 0 # This file is secret
key-direction 0
# Select a cryptographic cipher.
# This config item must be copied to
# the client config file as well.
# Note that 2.4 client/server will automatically
# negotiate AES-256-GCM in TLS mode.
# See also the ncp-cipher option in the manpage
cipher AES-256-CBC
auth SHA256
# Enable compression on the VPN link and push the
# option to the client (2.4+ only, for earlier
# versions see below)
;compress lz4-v2
;push "compress lz4-v2"
# For compression compatible with older clients use comp-lzo
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# If you enable it here, you must also
# enable it in the client config file.
;comp-lzo
# The maximum number of concurrently connected
# clients we want to allow.
;max-clients 100
# It's a good idea to reduce the OpenVPN
# daemon's privileges after initialization.
#
# You can uncomment this out on
# non-Windows systems.
user nobody
group nogroup
# The persist options will try to avoid
# accessing certain resources on restart
# that may no longer be accessible because
# of the privilege downgrade.
persist-key
persist-tun
# Output a short status file showing
# current connections, truncated
# and rewritten every minute.
status openvpn-status.log
# By default, log messages will go to the syslog (or
# on Windows, if running as a service, they will go to
# the "\Program Files\OpenVPN\log" directory).
# Use log or log-append to override this default.
# "log" will truncate the log file on OpenVPN startup,
# while "log-append" will append to it. Use one
# or the other (but not both).
;log
openvpn.log
;log-append openvpn.log
# Set the appropriate level of log
# file verbosity.
#
# 0 is silent, except for fatal errors
# 4 is reasonable for general usage
# 5 and 6 can help to debug connection problems
# 9 is extremely verbose
verb 3
# Silence repeating messages. At most 20
# sequential messages of the same message
# category will be output to the log.
;mute 20
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# Notify the client that when the server restarts so it
# can automatically reconnect.
explicit-exit-notify 1

A.3 /etc/sysctl.conf
#
# /etc/sysctl.conf - Configuration file for setting system variables
# See /etc/sysctl.d/ for additional system variables.
# See sysctl.conf (5) for information.
#
#kernel.domainname = example.com
# Uncomment the following to stop low-level messages on console
#kernel.printk = 3 4 1 3
##############################################################3
# Functions previously found in netbase
#
# Uncomment the next two lines to enable Spoof protection (reversepath filter)
# Turn on Source Address Verification in all interfaces to
# prevent some spoofing attacks
#net.ipv4.conf.default.rp_filter=1
#net.ipv4.conf.all.rp_filter=1
# Uncomment the next line to enable TCP/IP SYN cookies
# See http://lwn.net/Articles/277146/
# Note: This may impact IPv6 TCP sessions too
#net.ipv4.tcp_syncookies=1
# Uncomment the next line to enable packet forwarding for IPv4
net.ipv4.ip_forward=1
# Uncomment the next line to enable packet forwarding for IPv6
# Enabling this option disables Stateless Address Autoconfiguration
# based on Router Advertisements for this host
#net.ipv6.conf.all.forwarding=1
###################################################################
# Additional settings - these settings can improve the network
# security of the host and prevent against some network attacks
# including spoofing attacks and man in the middle attacks through
# redirection. Some network environments, however, require that these
# settings are disabled so review and enable them as needed.
#
# Do not accept ICMP redirects (prevent MITM attacks)
#net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_redirects = 0
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#net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_redirects = 0
# _or_
# Accept ICMP redirects only for gateways listed in our default
# gateway list (enabled by default)
# net.ipv4.conf.all.secure_redirects = 1
#
# Do not send ICMP redirects (we are not a router)
#net.ipv4.conf.all.send_redirects = 0
#
# Do not accept IP source route packets (we are not a router)
#net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_source_route = 0
#net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_source_route = 0
#
# Log Martian Packets
#net.ipv4.conf.all.log_martians = 1
#
###################################################################
# Magic system request Key
# 0=disable, 1=enable all
# Debian kernels have this set to 0 (disable the key)
# See https://www.kernel.org/doc/Documentation/sysrq.txt
# for what other values do
#kernel.sysrq=1
###################################################################
# Protected links
#
# Protects against creating or following links under certain
conditions
# Debian kernels have both set to 1 (restricted)
# See https://www.kernel.org/doc/Documentation/sysctl/fs.txt
#fs.protected_hardlinks=0
#fs.protected_symlinks=0

A.4 /usr/share/doc/openvpn/examples/sample-script/bridge-start
#!/bin/bash
#################################
# Set up Ethernet bridge on Linux
# Requires: bridge-utils
#################################
# Define Bridge Interface
br="br0"
# Define list of TAP interfaces to be bridged,
# for example tap="tap0 tap1 tap2".
tap="tap0"
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# Define physical ethernet interface to be bridged
# with TAP interface(s) above.
eth="eth0"
eth_ip="192.168.43.1"
eth_netmask="255.255.255.0"
eth_broadcast="192.168.43.255"
for t in $tap; do
openvpn --mktun --dev $t
done
brctl addbr $br
brctl addif $br $eth
for t in $tap; do
brctl addif $br $t
done
for t in $tap; do
ifconfig $t 0.0.0.0 promisc up
done
ifconfig $eth 0.0.0.0 promisc up
ifconfig $br $eth_ip netmask $eth_netmask broadcast $eth_broadcast

A.5 /etc/ufw/before.rules
#
# rules.before
#
# Rules that should be run before the ufw command line added rules.
Custom
# rules should be added to one of these chains:
#
ufw-before-input
#
ufw-before-output
#
ufw-before-forward
#
# START OPENVPN RULES
# NAT table rules
*nat
:POSTROUTING ACCEPT [0:0]
# Allow traffic from OpenVPN client to ens160 (change to the interface
you discovered)
-A POSTROUTING -s 192.168.43.0/8 -o ens160 -j MASQUERADE
COMMIT
# END OPENVPN RULES
# Don't delete these required lines, otherwise there will be errors
*filter
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:ufw-before-input - [0:0]
:ufw-before-output - [0:0]
:ufw-before-forward - [0:0]
:ufw-not-local - [0:0]
# End required lines
# allow all on loopback
-A ufw-before-input -i lo -j ACCEPT
-A ufw-before-output -o lo -j ACCEPT
# quickly process packets for which we already have a connection
-A ufw-before-input -m conntrack --ctstate RELATED,ESTABLISHED -j
ACCEPT
-A ufw-before-output -m conntrack --ctstate RELATED,ESTABLISHED -j
ACCEPT
-A ufw-before-forward -m conntrack --ctstate RELATED,ESTABLISHED -j
ACCEPT
# drop INVALID packets (logs these in loglevel medium and higher)
-A ufw-before-input -m conntrack --ctstate INVALID -j ufw-logging-deny
-A ufw-before-input -m conntrack --ctstate INVALID -j DROP
# ok icmp codes for
-A ufw-before-input
ACCEPT
-A ufw-before-input
-A ufw-before-input
-A ufw-before-input
-A ufw-before-input

INPUT
-p icmp --icmp-type destination-unreachable -j
-p
-p
-p
-p

icmp
icmp
icmp
icmp

--icmp-type
--icmp-type
--icmp-type
--icmp-type

# ok icmp code for FORWARD
-A ufw-before-forward -p icmp
ACCEPT
-A ufw-before-forward -p icmp
-A ufw-before-forward -p icmp
-A ufw-before-forward -p icmp
-A ufw-before-forward -p icmp

source-quench -j ACCEPT
time-exceeded -j ACCEPT
parameter-problem -j ACCEPT
echo-request -j ACCEPT

--icmp-type destination-unreachable -j
--icmp-type
--icmp-type
--icmp-type
--icmp-type

source-quench -j ACCEPT
time-exceeded -j ACCEPT
parameter-problem -j ACCEPT
echo-request -j ACCEPT

# allow dhcp client to work
-A ufw-before-input -p udp --sport 67 --dport 68 -j ACCEPT
#
# ufw-not-local
#
-A ufw-before-input -j ufw-not-local
# if LOCAL, RETURN
-A ufw-not-local -m addrtype --dst-type LOCAL -j RETURN
# if MULTICAST, RETURN
-A ufw-not-local -m addrtype --dst-type MULTICAST -j RETURN
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# if BROADCAST, RETURN
-A ufw-not-local -m addrtype --dst-type BROADCAST -j RETURN
# all other non-local packets are dropped
-A ufw-not-local -m limit --limit 3/min --limit-burst 10 -j ufwlogging-deny
-A ufw-not-local -j DROP
# allow MULTICAST mDNS for service discovery (be sure the MULTICAST
line above
# is uncommented)
-A ufw-before-input -p udp -d 224.0.0.251 --dport 5353 -j ACCEPT
# allow MULTICAST UPnP for service discovery (be sure the MULTICAST
line above
# is uncommented)
-A ufw-before-input -p udp -d 239.255.255.250 --dport 1900 -j ACCEPT
# don't delete the 'COMMIT' line or these rules won't be processed
COMMIT

A.6 client1.opvn
##############################################
# Sample client-side OpenVPN 2.0 config file #
# for connecting to multi-client server.
#
#
#
# This configuration can be used by multiple #
# clients, however each client should have
#
# its own cert and key files.
#
#
#
# On Windows, you might want to rename this #
# file so it has a .ovpn extension
#
##############################################
# Specify that we are a client and that we
# will be pulling certain config file directives
# from the server.
client
# Use the same setting
# the server.
# On most systems, the
# unless you partially
# the firewall for the
dev tap
;dev tun

as you are using on
VPN will not function
or fully disable
TUN/TAP interface.

# Windows needs the TAP-Win32 adapter name
# from the Network Connections panel
# if you have more than one. On XP SP2,
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# you may need to disable the firewall
# for the TAP adapter.
;dev-node MyTap
# Are we connecting to a TCP or
# UDP server? Use the same setting as
# on the server.
;proto tcp
proto udp
# The hostname/IP and port of the server.
# You can have multiple remote entries
# to load balance between the servers.
remote 192.168.42.2 1194
;remote my-server-2 1194
# Choose a random host from the remote
# list for load-balancing. Otherwise
# try hosts in the order specified.
;remote-random
# Keep trying indefinitely to resolve the
# host name of the OpenVPN server. Very useful
# on machines which are not permanently connected
# to the internet such as laptops.
resolv-retry infinite
# Most clients don't need to bind to
# a specific local port number.
nobind
# Downgrade privileges after initialization (non-Windows only)
user nobody
group nogroup
# Try to preserve some state across restarts.
persist-key
persist-tun
# If you are connecting through an
# HTTP proxy to reach the actual OpenVPN
# server, put the proxy server/IP and
# port number here. See the man page
# if your proxy server requires
# authentication.
;http-proxy-retry # retry on connection failures
;http-proxy [proxy server] [proxy port #]
# Wireless networks often produce a lot
# of duplicate packets. Set this flag
# to silence duplicate packet warnings.
;mute-replay-warnings
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# SSL/TLS parms.
# See the server config file for more
# description. It's best to use
# a separate .crt/.key file pair
# for each client. A single ca
# file can be used for all clients.
#ca ca.crt
#cert client.crt
#key client.key
# Verify server certificate by checking that the
# certicate has the correct key usage set.
# This is an important precaution to protect against
# a potential attack discussed here:
# http://openvpn.net/howto.html#mitm
#
# To use this feature, you will need to generate
# your server certificates with the keyUsage set to
#
digitalSignature, keyEncipherment
# and the extendedKeyUsage to
#
serverAuth
# EasyRSA can do this for you.
remote-cert-tls server
# If a tls-auth key is used on the server
# then every client must also have the key.
;tls-auth ta.key 1
# Select a cryptographic cipher.
# If the cipher option is used on the server
# then you must also specify it here.
cipher AES-256-CBC
auth SHA256
# Enable compression on the VPN link.
# Don't enable this unless it is also
# enabled in the server config file.
;comp-lzo
# Set log file verbosity.
verb 3
# Silence repeating messages
;mute 20
key-direction 1
# script-security 2
# up /etc/openvpn/update-resolve-conf
# down /etc/openvpn/update-resolve-conf
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A.7 ~/client-configs/make_config.sh
#!/bin/bash
# First argument: Client identifier
KEY_DIR=~/openvpn-ca/keys

OUTPUT_DIR=~/client-configs/files

BASE_CONFIG=~/client-configs/base.conf
cat ${BASE_CONFIG} \

<(echo -e '<ca>') \

${KEY_DIR}/ca.crt \

<(echo -e '</ca>\n<cert>') \
${KEY_DIR}/${1}.crt \

<(echo -e '</cert>\n<key>') \

${KEY_DIR}/${1}.key \

<(echo -e '</key>\n<tls-auth>') \
${KEY_DIR}/ta.key \

<(echo -e '</tls-auth>') \
> ${OUTPUT_DIR}/${1}.ovpn
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APPENDIX B.

SECURITY ONION /ETC/NETWORK/INTERFACES FILE

# This configuration was created by the Security Onion setup script.
#
# The original network interface configuration file was backed up to:
# /etc/network/interfaces.bak.
#
# This file describes the network interfaces available on your system
# and how to activate them. For more information, see interfaces(5).

# loopback network interface
auto lo
iface lo inet loopback

# Management network interface
auto eth0
iface eth0 inet static
address 192.168.230.105
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gateway 192.168.230.1
netmask 255.255.255.0
dns-nameservers 8.8.8.8 8.8.4.4
dns-domain csrl-seconion

auto eth1
iface eth1 inet manual
up ip link set eth1 promisc on arp off up
down ip link set eth1 promisc off down
post-up ethtool -G eth1 rx ; for i in rx tx sg tso ufo gso gro lro;
do ethtool -K
post-up echo 1 > /proc/sys/net/ipv6/conf/eth1/disable_ipv6

auto eth2
iface eth2 inet manual
up ip link set eth2 promisc on arp off up
down ip link set eth2 promisc off down
post-up ethtool -G eth2 rx ; for i in rx tx sg tso ufo gso gro lro;
do ethtool -K
post-up echo 1 > /proc/sys/net/ipv6/conf/eth2/disable_ipv6
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auto br0
iface br0 inet manual
bridge_ports eth1 eth2
up ip link set br0 promisc on arp off up
down ip link set br0 promisc off down
post-up ethtool -G br0 rx ; for i in rx tx sg tso ufo gso gro lro;
do ethtool -K
post-up echo 1 > /proc/sys/net/ipv6/conf/br0/disable_ipv6
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